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PROCEDURAL NOTE 
This is a Petition for Rehearing is filed by appellant Maverik 
pursuant to Rule 3 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. It 
is a consolidated Petition for Rehearing on two appeal numbers: 
Docket Number 920206-CA and Docket Number 910413-CA. Those two 
appeals are from the same Industrial Commission administrative 
case, and were combined for oral argument. The decision of this 
Court was rendered as a consolidated decision, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Appendix A. The decision was rendered on June 
3, 1993. 
INTRODUCTION TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
This is a case in which the Court held, in essence, that 
Maverik has no remedy because, although it filed two appeals, one 
was too early and the other was too late. In so finding, the Court 
misapprehended the law, setting a problematic precedent that should 
not become law. Because the misperceived law was not adequately 
briefed, the Court was unaware that its ruling was contrary to the 
opinion of the Utah Supreme Court. 
The underlying case is a claim that when Maverik fired 
claimant/respondent McCord, it was guilty of handicap 
1 
discrimination. The Court did not reach any of the appeal issues, 
since both appeals were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 
FACTS PERTINENT TO REHEARING 
Most of the relevant facts are set forth in pages one through 
four of the Court's Opinion. Appendix 1. One of the "facts" as 
stated in the Opinion needs clarification, however. The court 
observed that McCord was hired (two weeks after termination by 
Maverik and at a higher wage) as a school custodian. Opinion p. 2. 
However, the Court stated that she "quit due to an unrelated 
illness." Id. 
That the illness was "unrelated" is not supported by the 
record. As the Court observes, it should base its decision on 
facts found by the Commission. See, King v. Industrial Commission, 
209 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 34 (Utah App. 1993). The Commission 
actually found that she quit, and that it was due to illness beyond 
her control, Findings, p. 5, 8. But the Commission did not find 
that it was from a problem unrelated to the condition she claims 
Maverik fired her for. McCord of feared no evidence as to the 
physical condition that made her quit.. 
The facts most relevant to this Petition are: 
1. On June 26, 1991 the ALJ issued its order resolving all 
matters on their merits, but reserving the amount of attorney fees 
2 
to be awarded. Opinion, p. 3. 
2. On July 26, 1991 Maverik filed its Writ of Review with 
this Court ("first appeal"). Id. See Docket No. 910413-CA. 
3. On September 10, 1991, despite the pending appeal, the 
Commission issued its Supplemental Order limited to the issue of 
attorney fees. Id. 
4. Despite its pending appeal, Maverik, McCord and the 
Commission continued to litigate at the agency level. Id. 
5. Maverik filed a Request for Review within the Industrial 
Commission, which was not received until October 11, 1991 (deemed 
to be one day late). Id. 
6. Maverik's "second appeal" (920206-CA) was a Writ of Review 
with this Court, claiming that the Commission erred or abused its 
discretion in finding Maverik's Request for Review untimely. Id.; 
see also, briefs of Maverik in second appeal. 
7. Oral argument was held on May 20, 1993. At argument it 
became clear that the Court's panel was focusing closely on the 
jurisdictional issues rather than the merits. Under questioning by 
Presiding Judge Billings, Maverik's counsel in essence conceded 
that the first Commission order of June 26th was not final, since 
the attorney fee issue was reserved.1 This, however, is not an 
1
 A few days after oral argument, a prominent local attorney 
who was in the audience at oral argument directed Maverik's counsel 
3 
accurate statement of the law. See argument below. 
8. The Court's Opinion was issued June 3, 199 3. Appendix 1. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For years the federal courts have held that where a tribunal 
reserves only the issue of attorney fees, the resulting order is 
final and appealable. Utah (like many other states) seems to have 
adopted the federal rule in 1989. This Court's decision that 
Maverik's first appeal was nonfinal because the attorney fee issues 
was reserved is contrary to this authority, and therefore in error. 
This Court was also mistaken in holding that the first appeal, 
filed within thirty days of the Industrial Commission's initial 
order but a few weeks before its Supplemental Order, was premature. 
The Court may not have considered Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, which makes such a premature appeal effective 
as if filed on the date the final order was entered. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The first order was final. The law on this point was not 
to the decision of Allen Steel Co. v. Crossroads Plaza Associates, 
119 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah 1989, later settled and withdrawn during 
rehearing process). See discussion in Argument section below. 
4 
fully discussed in the briefing.2 At oral argument, the panel of 
this Court and the respective counsel proceeded on the incorrect 
assumption that the agency's reservation of the attorney fee issue 
made the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the ALJ 
nonfinal.3 The Court's opinion uses this misunderstanding of the 
law to hold that the Court had no jurisdiction; that the first 
appeal was from a nonfinal order.4 See, e.g. pp. 2, 5. 
The Findings, Conclusions and Order disposed of all issues and 
constituted a final (albeit incorrect) determination on the merits. 
The issue of attorney fee entitlement or amount is ai wholly 
separable matter. The agency's reservation of that issue does not 
make the order nonfinal or prevent it from being appealed. 
2. Utah has chosen to allow an appeal on which the attorney 
2
 As the Court alluded to in footnote 4 of the Opinion, the 
Court is at a disadvantage when an issue is not fully briefed. 
Such was the case here, where the line of cases and the rule 
pertinent to this Petition for Rehearing were not fully presented 
to the Court. 
3
 Of course jurisdiction either exists or it does not, and 
cannot be created or destroyed by acquiescence of the parties. 
See, Arnica Mut. Ins. v. Schettler, 738 P.2d 641 (Utah 1987). 
4
 The opinion which is about to be published contains 
incorrect law. Fortunately, the rehearing process permitted by 
Rule 35, Utah R. App. P., allow this problem to be remedied before 
this case is used as precedent, and short of petitioning for 
certiorari. 
5 
fee issue remains pending. The holding that the first appeal is 
not final is erroneous. The question facing this Court was whether 
reservation of the attorney fee issue in an otherwise final order 
makes the order nonappealable. This issue is one of first 
impression in Utah, except for the case of Allen Steel Co. v. 
Crossroads Plaza Associates/ 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah S. Ct. 
1989, rehearing before Supreme Court requested and briefed and case 
settled without publication in Pacific Reporter). The Allen Steel 
decision is attached hereto as Appendix 2. 
Not one of our previous cases has expressly ruled on the 
specific issue of whether the* deferral of awarding 
attorney fees makes a judgment nonfinal and therefore 
noncertifiable under Rule 54(b). See, e.g., Elder v. 
Triax Co., 740 P. 2d 1320 (Utah 1987) [see Justice Howe's 
dissent at 1324]; Arnica Mutual Ins. v. Schettler, 738 
P.2d 641 (Utah 1987); Olsen v. Salt Lake City School 
Dist., 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986) . . . . 
Allen Steel, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Allen Steel is at very 
least a statement of what Utah's law is or should be.5 That case 
involved the issue of finality, though it related to Rule 54(b), 
5
 The Allen Steel decision was pulled and never published. 
A petition for rehearing was pending in the Utah Supreme Court when 
the appeal was dismissed by stipulation on April 1, 1991. Allen 
Steel was cited once, in Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick 
Resources Corp., 805 P.2d 164 (Utah 1990). 
6 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.6 But the rule of law stated by the 
entire court7 in Allen Steel is stated in broad terms and applies 
here as well.8 Since finality under these circumstances is a 
question of first impression, Allen Steel used federal law for 
guidance. In determining procedural matters, the Court may freely 
refer to authorities which have interpreted similar issues in 
federal courts. Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources 
Corp., 805 P.2d 164 (Utah 1990). Allen Steel reasoned: 
At federal law, a pending claim for attorney fees does 
not make a judgment on the merits nonappealable. See 
Beaudry Motor Co. v. Abko Properties, Inc., 780 F.2d 751, 
755 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986) . . . 
; Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Daniels, 763 F.2d 286, 292, 
aff'd on rehearing, 768 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1985) (M[A] 
judgment on the merits is appealable — independently of 
6
 Rule 54 states in part, "When more than one claim for relief 
is presented in an action, . . . . and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon 
an express determination by the court that there is no just reason 
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. 
. . . Rule 54(b), Utah R. Civ. Proc. 
7
 Justices Hall, Howe and Durham joined in the opinion written 
by justice Stewart. Justice Zimmerman concurred in the pertinent 
portion of the opinion. 
8
 Rule 54 has no applicability to reservation of the attorney 
fee issue. Beaudry Motor Co. v. ABKO Properties, Inc., 780 F.2d 
751, 755 (9th Cir. 1986), citing to International Assoc, of Bridge 
v. Madison Industries, Inc., 733 F.2d 656, 658 (9th Cir. 1984) (a 
judgment on the merits is final and appealable even though a 
request for attorney fees is pending); Swanson v. American Consumer 
Industries, Inc., 517 F.2d 555, 571 (7th Cir. 1975) (Rule 54(b) 
inapplicable to outstanding claim for attorney fees). 
7 
Rule 54(b) — despite the fact that questions of fees 
remain."). Thus, an actual award of attorney fees need 
not be reduced to judgment to make the judgement final 
for appeal purposes since the fees awarded will often 
include the fees incurred on appeal. 
Allen Steel, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9, emphasis supplied. 
3. Federal law would clearly allow jurisdiction. It is not 
surprising that the Allen Steel case looked to federal law in the 
absence of any Utah state law. 
In addition to the above mentioned cases from various federal 
courts of appeals, this issue has been determined by the United 
States Supreme Court, in Budinich v. Bectom Dickinson and Co., 486 
U.S. 196, 100 L.Ed.2d 178, 108 S.Ct. 1717 (1988). A copy of the 
Budinich decision, which affirms the holding of the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, is attached as Appendix 3. 
Budinich was interestingly similar to the jurisdictional 
problem here. There the trial court entered an order determining 
the merits of the case, and (as with the agency order here) said a 
reasonable attorney fee should be awarded. The trial court 
requested that the parties brief and document the attorney fees 
before the amount was determined. The Tenth Circuit correctly 
found that the first order was final and appealable despite the 
reservation of the attorney fee issue, and that an appeal was 
waived if not filed within thirty days of that order. 
8 
After a careful review of the various authorities and 
equities, the need for operational consistency and predictability 
"requires, we think, a uniform rule that an unresolved issue of 
attorney's fees for the litigation in question does not prevent 
judgment on the merits from being final." Id., 108 S.Ct. at 1722, 
emphasis supplied. 
Courts and litigants are best served by the bright-line 
rule, which accords with traditional understanding, that 
a decision on the merits is a 'final decision' for 
purposes of [28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 providing for appeal of 
district court 'final decisions'] whether or not there 
remains for adjudication a request for attorney's fees 
attributable to the case. 
Budinich, 108 S.Ct. at 1722, emphasis supplied. 
4. Other states hold such an order final and appealable. 
See, e.g., Schleft v. Board of Education of Los Alamos, 752 P.2d 
248, 249 (CA New Mexico 1988) ("the pendency of a proceeding solely 
to determine the amount of costs does not render an otherwise final 
judgment nonfinal", using federal cases for guidance); Azer v. 
Myers, 8 Haw. App. 86, 793 P.2d 1189, 1216-17, cert, granted, 833 
P. 2d 901, cert, denied, 833 P. 2d 901, affirmed in part, reversed in 
part (not on finality issue), 795 P.2d 853 (Haw. App. 1990) (An 
order awarding attorney fees but not setting the amount is 
appealable). 
In Baldwin v. Bright Mortgage Company, 757 P. 2d 1072 (Colo. 
9 
1988) the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to review that 
state's Court of Appeals' decision, The intermediate appellate 
court had ruled that an appeal of a decision on the merits was 
nonfinal and nonappealable, because the trial court had expressly 
reserved the determination of the amount of attorney fees for later 
decision. 
Baldwin relied heavily on Budinich v. Bectom Dickinson and 
Co., 486 U.S. 196, 100 L.Ed.2d 178, 108 S.Ct. 1717 (1988), 
discussed above and attached as Appendix 3. 
Nevertheless, we believe the that a bright line rule that 
a decision on the merits is a final judgment for appeal 
purposes despite any outstanding issue of attorney fees 
is necessary and appropriate. Such a rule will permit 
litigants to comply with the relevant appellate rules 
without a case-by-case analysis of the relationship of 
attorney fees to the relief sought and will avoid 
uncertainty. If judgment has been entered and only the 
issue of attorney fees remains to be determined, 
certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) is not a 
prerequisite to appellate review of the merits of the 
case. 
We hold that a final judgment on the merits is appealable 
regardless of any unresolved issue of attorney fees, and 
we therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and remand with directions to reinstate the petitioner's 
appeal. 
Baldwin, 757 P.2d at 1074, emphasis supplied. 
Idaho has likewise followed the rule adopted by the aborted 
Allen Steel decision of Utah's Supreme Court. Thompson v. Pike, 
122 Idaho 702, 838 P.2d 305 (Idaho App. 1991). "In the present 
case . . . the district court's decision and dismissal order 
10 
resolved all substantive issues raised in the litigation, leaving 
only the question of an award of costs and attorney fees for 
further determination. For the purposes of appeal, the dismissal 
order was a 'final judgment'. . . ." Id., 838 P.2d at 308. 
In Snodgrass v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins., 789 P.2d 211 
(Kan. 1990) (following federal court decisions), the Kansas Court 
of Appeals' ruling that it had no jurisdiction was reversed. MA 
decision on the merits is final for purposes of appeal even if a 
request or motion for attorney fees attributable to the case has 
not yet been determined." Id., 838 P. 2d at 213, 215. Accord, 
Bradley v. Oregon Trail Sav. & Loan Assoc, 47 Or.App. 871, 617 
P.2d 263, 268-69 (Ore. App. 1980). 
5. Since the initial order was final, the Court has 
jurisdiction. The appeal should be reviewed on its merits, as 
exhaustively briefed by the parties and the agency. And this being 
the case, McCord is probably not a "prevailing party" and the 
attorney fee award should also fail. 
6. Even if the first appeal was premature, it is valid. The 
other rule the parties and Court Panel failed to properly consider, 
is Rule 4(c), Utah R. App. P. Essentially, the Court ruled that 
the first appeal was too early, and the second one too late. Rule 
11 
4 makes the appeal valid, effective when it should have been filed. 
That rule states, 
Except as provided in paragreiph (b) of this rule, a 
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the 
judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as 
filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
Id. Should the Court stick by its determination that the first 
appeal was premature, this is precisely what happened here and the 
rule applies. The appeal is effective as of the date the 
Supplemental Order relating to attorney fees was entered (September 
10, 1991). 
Although timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional, . . 
. premature filing of the notice of appeal does not 
deprive this Court of jurisdiction where the final 
judgment entered is in accord with the ruling appealed 
from and no post-judgment motions have been made. 
CMC Cassity, Inc. v. Aird, 707 P. 2d 1304, 1305 (Utah 1985) 
(citations omitted). 
7. There is no need to revisit Heinecke. Heinecke v. 
Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991). In footnote 
4 of the Opinion, the Court suggested it might revisit that case at 
the request of the Industrial Commission. 
The Commission makes out no convincing argument as to why the 
Court should reverse itself, in derogation of the two year old 
expectations of Maverik and other litigants similarly situated. 
12 
The Commission seeks to ignore the clear wording difference between 
the various administrative review statutes, and to turn all 
instances in which parties "may" seek review in the agency into 
mandatory agency review, despite the lack of mandatory language. 
Under Section 63-46b-16 (4) (d) , Utah Code the Court may grant 
relief from agency action if the agency has "erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law", prejudicing the appellant. 
Chevron v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2 07 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 3 (Jan. 
29, 1993) (citation omitted) . "We do not defer to an agency's 
statutory interpretation unless the legislature has explicitly, or 
implicitly, granted the agency discretion to interpret the 
statutory language at issue." Id. There is no such grant here. 
The Commission's attack on Heinecke arises largely from 
negative logic. "There is no reason for this Court to conclude . 
. . that U.C.A. Sections 63-46b-12(1)(a) and 14(2A) cannot be read 
together to require Maverik to exhaust its administrative remedies 
prior to filing a judicial appeal." Response Br. at 31. In 
essence, the Commission asks the Court to reword the statute; to 
make "may" mean "shall", and to narrowly circumscribe jurisdiction 
because it can think of no reason not to do so. Br. at 31. 
Statutory language is not so lightly cast aside. The agency should 
petition the legislature for the change, not this Court. 
Heinecke was discussed without reversal or even criticism just 
13 
last year. Barney v. Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, 828 P. 2d 542, 544 (Utah 1992) (administrative review 
prior to judicial appeal is optional). 
8. No judgment amount has been entered. Never in all its 
orders has there been a definite judgment amount entered. For the 
Court to do anything but allow this appeal leaves this case in 
limbo, and Maverik and McCord are left without knowing how much 
Maverik would owe McCord.9 
In the event the Court disregards all the foregoing arguments 
and maintains that it is without jurisdiction to hear the first 
appeal, the second one is well taken. How can Maverik's Request 
for Review be a day late, if there was never an order setting the 
judgment amount? 
CONCLUSION 
If correct legal principals are looked to, the first appeal 
must be within this Court's jurisdiction, and the second was not 
late. The appeal should be reinstated and determined on its 
9
 It is doubtful McCord would accept or the Commission would 
issue a satisfaction based on a check made payable to McCord for 
"in the range of $8,000." 
14 
merits.10 
The leading case in the area was ignored by McCord and the 
Agency throughout the agency and appeal levels of this case. This 
Court should take the opportunity to construe and apply it. Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983). This issue 
alone is dispositive and requires reversal, because the ALJ applied 
the wrong legal standard to determine whether there was handicap 
discrimination. 
Handicap discrimination may only occur if the work at issue is 
found to be a "major life activity". Section 34-35-6, Utah Code. 
The Commission's position11 is that all jobs, without regard to 
10
 Some of the problems with the merits include: 
a. The Commission's refusal to consider whether McCord's loss 
of her part time convenience store clerking job can be a 
substantial interference with a major life activity; 
b. How to reconcile the fact that McCord got a higher paying 
job just two weeks after leaving Maverik, a job she later quit 
because of "health reasons", with an award of a couple of years of 
back-pay and thousands of dollars in attorney fees; 
c. why Maverik should suffer when, in delaying the proceeding 
for over two years, the Commission violated Section 34-35-
7.1(3)(b), Utah Code; 
d. how the Court can do anything but reverse the Commission, 
when it has itself changed its mind about the finality of the first 
order appealed from; 
e. how McCord can win a handicap discrimination action with 
no medical evidence (except a definition of the condition she 
claims to have). 
11
 The issue of the meaning of "major life activity" is a 
question of statutory construction. In such an issue, no 
particular deference is given to the agency's interpretation of the 
15 
their nature or whether they are full or part time, are major life 
activities.12 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of June, 1993. 
Ronald C. Barker 
Mitchell R. Barker 
David C. Cundick 
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statute. Chevron v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2 07 Utah Adv. Rep. 
23 (Jan. 29, 1993); Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. State Tax 
Commission, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 (Utah App. 1993). This a 
true a fortiori here, since the Confer case already interpreted the 
statute in a way contrary to the agency's application. 
12
 Importantly, this is not a factual issue, but an example of 
the ALJ refusing to apply the standard imposed by the Utah courts. 
The Commission refused to even acknowledge the existence of Confer, 
much less to follow its requirement that it determine whether 
McCord's part time convenience store clerking job was a "major life 
activity11. Id. at 63 6. 
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Attorneys: Ronald C. Barker, Mitchell R. Barker, and David G. 
Cundick, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner 
Benjamin A. Sims and Sharon J. Eblen, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondent Industrial Commission of Utah 
James W. Stewart and Lisa Jones, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondent Vicky Ann McCord 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon. 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
Maverik Country Stores brings separate appeals from two 
decisions of the Industrial Commission of Utah. The first appeal 
is from the Industrial Commission's determination that Maverik 
violated Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to -8 (1988 & Supp. 1993), the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, in its treatment of Vicky Ann 
McCord. The second appeal is from the Industrial Commission's 
ruling that Maverik's request for agency review was untimely. We 
dismiss the first appeal and affirm the ruling in the second. 
FACTS 
Ms. Jones, a Maverik store manager, hired Ms. McCord as a 
convenience store clerk on September 30, 1988.l McCord worked 
1. Because Appellant does not challenge the factual findings of 
the Industrial Commission, we recite the facts in accord with 
(...continued) 
1991 decision included a specific reservation of the issue of 
appropriate attorney fees. On September 10, 1991, the ALJ issued 
a Supplemental Order disposing of the issue of attorney fees. 
On July 26, 1991, Maverik filed a Writ of Review with this 
court (first appeal). The first appeal is from the ALJ's Order 
of June 26, 1991. On August 26, 1991, McCord and the Industrial 
Commission filed motions to dismiss the first appeal based on 
Maverik's failure to exhaust administrative remedies and lack of 
a final order. On September 16, 1991, this court ordered those 
motions deferred, and requested the parties include arguments on 
those issues in their briefs on the merits• 
Despite its pending appeal, Maverik then filed a Request for 
Review by the Industrial Commission of the ALJ's June 26, 1991 
and September 10, 1991 Orders. The date the request was filed is 
unclear. Counsel for Maverik signed and dated the request 
October 10, 1991. The request has two received dates stamped on 
it, October 11, 1991 and October 15, 1991. In later orders 
referring to the request, the Industrial Commission refers to 
both dates as the day it received the request. For the purposes 
of our review, we assume the request was received October 11, 
1991. 
On February 28, 1992, the Industrial Commission denied 
Maverik's Request for Review based on its untimeliness.2 On 
March 19, 1992, Maverik filed a request with the Industrial 
Commission to reconsider its denial of the Request for Review. 
On March 30, 1992, the Industrial Commission denied Maverik's 
Request for Reconsideration. In this denial, the Industrial 
Commission recognized it could have allowed the late Request for 
Review if Maverik had shown good cause for extension of the time 
period. The Industrial Commission ruled, however, that Maverik 
had failed to show good cause for the extension. 
On April 3, 1992, Maverik filed a "Limited Request for 
Reconsideration11 in which it finally attempted to show good cause 
for its late filing of the original Request for Review. The 
Industrial Commission did not respond to this unique motion. On 
April 7, 1992, Maverik filed a Writ of Review with this court 
(second appeal). The second appeal is from the Industrial 
Commission's Order Denying Review and Order Denying Request For 
Reconsideration. 
2. In the Order denying the Request for Review, the Industrial 
Commission also addressed and rejected Maverik's claims on the 
merits. Because of our ultimate conclusion, we need not and do 
not comment on the propriety of the Industrial Commission's 
disposition on the merits. 
We, therefore, have no jurisdiction over the first appeal and 
must dismiss it.4 
THE SECOND APPEAL 
A. Industrial Commission's Jurisdiction 
Maverik contends the filing of the first appeal, regardless 
of its timeliness, divested the Industrial Commission of 
jurisdiction to continue to act in the case. Thus, according to 
Maverik, every action taken by the Industrial Commission after 
the ALJ's June 2 6 Order is a nullity. Maverik would have us 
remand to the Industrial Commission for entry of the Supplemental 
Order on attorney fees and the agency appeals process. Maverik 
does not provide any relevant authority supporting this 
contention. 
Other courts have consistently recognized an appeal from a 
non-final order does not divest the administrative tribunal of 
4. Because we find there was no final order prior to the first 
appeal, we do not reach the issue of whether we also lack 
jurisdiction because Maverik failed to exhaust its administrative 
remedies. The Industrial Commission asks us to revisit our 
decision in Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 
(Utah App. 1991) , where we focused on the language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-12(1)(a) (1989) and held a petitioner need not 
avail himself of a review permitted by agency rule prior to 
filing an appeal to this court. We distinguished such permissive 
review from review which is statutorily mandated. Id. at 462. 
See also Hi-Country Homeowners Assoc, v. Public Service Comm'n, 
779 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah 1989) (holding all mandatory reviews must 
be exhausted prior to judicial appeal). 
In Heinecke, however, we did not address the impact of 
another section of UAPA which provides: "A party may seek 
judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies 
available . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (1989) 
(emphasis added). See also Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P„2d 519, 
524 n.3 (Utah 1989) (citing section 63-46b-14 for proposition 
petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies prior to judicial 
review). According to the Industrial Commission section 63-46b-
14(2) requires a party to utilize all permissive review prior to 
filing an administrative appeal. While we express no opinion 
today on that issue, we do note Heinecke was rendered without the 
benefit of briefing by counsel. Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 462. 
Further, we specifically recognized we might revisit the issue at 
an appropriate point in the future. Id. at 464 n.6. That day 
still awaits. 
n o no r\c —n A R 
B. Timeliness 
McCord and the Industrial Commission argue we should dismiss 
the second appeal because Maverik's Request for Review of the 
Final Order of the ALJ was untimely, Maverik responds its 
Request for Review was timely because either (1) Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 6(e) gives it three extra days to file the 
appeal, (2) the filing date is the date of mailing or, (3) the 
Industrial Commission abused its discretion in failing to extend 
the filing deadline by one day. The Final Order was issued 
September 10, 1991 and Maverik filed its Request for Review 
October 11, 1991. Whether URCP 6(e) is applicable or whether the 
crucial date is the mailing date are questions that involve the 
agency's application or interpretation of general law which we 
review under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for correction of error. 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 581, 587-89 (Utah 
1991); King v. Industrial Comm'n. 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 34 (Utah 
App. 1993). See also SEMECO v. Auditing Div., 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 
73, 76 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting). 
1. Date of Filing 
UAPA provides a request for review must be filed "within 3 0 
days after the issuance of the order . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-12(1)(a) (1988). The request must also "be sent by mail 
to the presiding officer and to each party." Id. § 63-46b-
12(1)(b)(iv). The parties agree the ALJ's final Order was dated 
and issued September 10, 1991. See Dusty's Inc. v. Auditing 
Div., 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992) (holding administrative order 
is issued on date on face of order). 
Maverik first argues that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e) 
gives it a three day extension on the thirty day filing deadline. 
That rule provides: "Whenever a party . . . is required to do 
some act . . . within a prescribed period after the service of a 
notice . . . upon him and the notice . . . is served by mail, 3 
days shall be added to the prescribed period." Utah R. Civ. P. 
6(e) (emphasis added). That rule must be read in light of 
section 63-46b-12(1)(a) of UAPA which requires a party to appeal 
thirty days after the issuance of the administrative ruling. 
Thus, Rule 6(e) does not apply because under section 63-46b-
12(1)(a) of UAPA the time for appeal runs from the issuance of an 
order not from the service of an order on a party. 
920206-CA •7 
in section 63-46b-12 requires, as a prerequisite to the agency 
taking jurisdiction over a review, actual delivery of the 
necessary documents to the agency within the thirty day time 
limit,. 
3. Extension of Filing Deadline 
Maverik next argues the Industrial Commission abused its 
discretion by failing to grant a one day extension of the filing 
deadline. Maverik does not identify the portion of 63-46b-16(4) 
under which it asks us to review this claim. See King v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 209 Utah Adv* Rep, 33, 35 n.6 (Utah App. March 
18, 1993) (encouraging counsel to clearly identify the portion of 
63-46b-16(4) under which review is sought). Because the 
authority to grant an extension in a filing deadline is not in an 
agency-specific statute, but rather a general provision of UAPA, 
and because Maverik is arguing an abuse of discretion standard, 
it appears Maverik is necessarily seeking review under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) (1988). That catch-all portion of 
section 63-46b-16(4) provides we can grant relief if the agency 
action is "arbitrary or capricious." Id. We review agency 
action under this section for reasonableness. Anderson v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah 1992). See also SEMECO v. 
Auditing Div., 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 73, 78 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., 
dissenting). 
a. The Original Request for Reconsideration 
For an agency to extend any deadline established under UAPA 
the petitioner must show good cause. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-l(9) (1988). In its Request for Reconsideration, Maverik 
made no attempt to show good cause. The Industrial Commission, 
in its Order denying the Request for Reconsideration, 
specifically notes Maverik's failure to show good cause. Thus, 
the Industrial Commission's decision denying Maverik a one day 
extension is not unreasonable in light of Maverik's complete 
failure to articulate any facts on which to base a good cause 
determination. 
b. The Second Request for Reconsideration 
In a document captioned "Limited Request for 
Reconsideration" filed April 3, 1992, six days after the original 
Request for Reconsideration was denied and four days before the 
second appeal was filed, Maverik finally attempts to show good 
cause. There is no authorization for a "Limited Request for 
Reconsideration" in UAPA. Counsel's failure to comply with the 
rules which set forth the requirements for getting an extension 
of the filing deadline does not give him the right to create 
CONCLUSION 
Maverik's first appeal was brought from a non-final Order of 
the Industrial Commission. Maverik's second appeal was brought 
from a reasonable ruling of the Industrial Commission that 
Maverik's Request for Review was untimely. Thus, we dismiss case 
9. (...continued) 
Within 2 0 days after the date that an order 
is issued for which review by the agency or 
by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 
is unavailable, and if the order would 
otherwise constitute final agency action, any 
party may file a written request for 
reconsideration with the agency . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(1)(a) (1989) (emphasis added). This 
section provides a petitioner with the option of applying to the 
agency for reconsideration or appealing to the courts. It does 
not provide a petitioner the opportunity to pursue both routes 
concurrently. The emphasized language indicates a petitioner who 
decides to file a request for reconsideration no longer has a 
"final agency action" from which to appeal. The petitioner must 
wait until the request is either responded to in writing or 
denied by operation of law. Section 63-46b-13(1)(a) provides a 
request for reconsideration is not a mandatory step in exhausting 
administrative remedies or reaching "finality" to give the courts 
jurisdiction over an appeal. It is a permissive step. 
Petitioners who choose to take advantage of this step must 
thereafter accept the consequences, one of which is that an 
appeal to the judicial system cannot be made until the agency 
acts on the request. 
Thus, the second request for reconsideration would have 
given the Industrial Commission another opportunity to address 
the merits. Therefore, as of April 7, 1992, Maverik would have 
no final order from which to appeal. Under this analysis, the 
second appeal would be brought from a non-final order over which 
we have no jurisdiction and we would dismiss it. 
Further, the window for Maverik to file an appeal from the 
Industrial Commission's denial of the second request would have 
been from April 23, 1992 to May 23, 1992. Thus, under either 
analysis, Maverik is left without judicial review of the merits. 
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WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
1. See, however, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
58A(d)» which requires the prevailing party to pro-
mptly give notice of the signing or entry of judg-
ment to all other parties and to file proof of service 
of such notice with the clerk of the court. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring In the 
Result) 
! concur in the disposition of the case made by 
the majority. However, I depart from the majority 
in my appraisal of the level of scrutiny the trial 
court gave the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law prepared by counsel for Tel-Tech. 
It is certainly true that a trial judge need not 
make any emendations in proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law to demonstrate that he 
or she has not abdicated the decision-making 
function to the lawyer who prepared the docu-
ment. However, here the court signed proposed 
findings that included a statement that "[n]o evi-
dence was introduced at trial ... of a surety bond" 
when this was not the case, and a ruling that 
exhibits previously admitted should be rejected, a 
ruling which was manifestly incorrect. Moreover, 
at the time the trial court asked the parties to 
submit their proposed findings, the court had not 
decided how the case was to come out; therefore, 
the parties had no guidance from the trial court as 
to how to craft their findings. It can be assumed 
that as a result, each party prepared findings that 
were favorable to it on all points, The foregoing 
facts give me pause and suggest that the trial court 
may have been less than assiduous in reviewing the 
proposed findings, perhaps simply signing those 
proposed by the party that prevailed on the basic 
issues. 
Trial judges are certainly entitled to ask the 
assistance of counsel in preparing findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. There is some danger that 
in the press of business, they may come to rely too 
heavily on these proposals and inadvertently 
permit counsel to inject findings that may not be 
entirely in conformity with the judge's views or 
that may deal with issues the judge has not even 
thought about. 
The finding of facts 'is an important part of the 
judicial function,* one that is designed to flesh out 
the rationale for the decision and one that "the 
judge cannot surrender ... to counsel." 9 Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2578, at 
705 (1971) [hereinafter Wright and Miller], As the 
United States Supreme Court has noted, findings 
of fact prepared by the court are "drawn with the 
insight of a disinterested mind" and* are "more 
helpful to the appellate court" than those prepared 
by counsel. United States v. EJ Paso Natural Oas 
Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 (1964). It is for this reason 
that the federal courts appear to have almost uni-
formly adopted the rule that while findings prep-
ared by counsel are sufficient under the federal 
analogue to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52, 
appellate courts 'will feel freer in close cases to 
disregard a finding or remand for further findings 
if the triaJ court did not prepare them him [or her] 
self." 9 Wright & Miller, at 707; see Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a); see, e.g., Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache 
Tribe of MescaJero Reservation, 616 F.2d 464 
(10th Cir. 1980]; Kelson v. United States, 503 F.2d 
1291 (10th Cir. 1974). 
I know that I apply a similar standard in revie-
wing findings prepared by counsel, and I suspect 
that other members of this Court do the same, 
although to my knowledge, we have never said so. 
In light of this fact and the rule stated above, trial 
courts would be well advised to be vigilant in 
guarding against the tendency to view findings as a 
detail to be dealt with as expeditiously as possible, 
rather than as a fundamental pan of the decisional 
process, one that goes to the heart of its integrity. 
In the same vein, counsel preparing proposed fin-
dings and conclusions should be cautious lest in 
their zeal, they incude proposals that may under-
mine the integrity of the judgment they hope to 
obtain. 
Cite is 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALLEN STEEL COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
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v. 
CROSSROADS PLAZA ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah Joint venture, The Equitable Life 
Assurance Society of the United States, a New 
York corporation, and Okland-Foulger 
Company, a general partnership, Deseret Title 
Holding Corporation, a Utah corporation, et 
• I . . 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No . 20532 
FILED: October 6, 1989 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
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ATTORNEYS: 
Joseph J. Palmer, H. Dennis Piercey, SaJt 
Lake City, for Allen Steel 
Bruce A. Maak, Thomas B. Green, Clark 
Waddoups, Salt Lake City, for Crossroads 
Plaza and Equitable Life Assurance, 
Wilford A. Beesley, Jack Fairclough, Salt 
Lake City, for Okland-Foulger 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff Allen Steel Company ('Allen Steel") 
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brought this action against defendants Crossroads 
Plaza Associates ('Crossroads'), Equitable Life 
Assurance Society of the United States 
( ' E q u i t a b l e * ) , Okiand-Foulger Company 
('Okiand-Foulger') and various other landowner 
defendants. The complaint sought a judgment 
against Okiand-Foulger for the unpaid amount 
on a construction contract between Allen Steel and 
Okiand-Foulger, a judgment against the remai-
ning defendant for their failure as leaseholders of 
the land where the building was erected to obtain a 
contractor's bond, and a judgment of foreclosure 
of a mechanic's lien Crossroads, Equitable, and 
Okiand-Foulger • counter claimed, seeking both an 
offset against Alien Steel's contractual claims and 
tort damages for an alleged defective design of the 
project by Allen Steel. In addition, Equitable cross-
claimed against Okiand-Foulger. 
The trial court entered a judgment for $579,294, 
plus interest, in favor of Allen Steel and against 
Okiand-Foulger, Crossroads, and Equitable and 
granted Allen Steel's request for foreclosure of its 
mechanic's lien. The court also awarded Allen 
Steel a deficiency judgment against Okiand-
Foulger for the judgment, costs, and attorney fees. 
The court denied Allen Steel's request for conse-
quential damages, including delay damages, 
against Okiand-Foulger, Crossroads, and Equit-
able. The trial judge also ruled that the mech-
anic's hen was not effective against the fee inter-
ests of the remaining defendant landowners and 
ordered Allen Steel to pay the landowners' atto-
rney fees and costs in an amount to be determined 
at a further proceeding. Finally, the trial court 
awarded Equitable a judgment for damages on its 
cross-claim against Okiand-Foulger under their 
joint venture agreement, but held that the amount 
of such damages should be determined in a subs-
equent proceeding. The court certified the case fpr 
appeal pursuant to the provisions of Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 54(b). 
Crossroads, Equitable, and Okiand-Foulger 
appeal the judgment against them and the trial 
court's dismissal of their counterclaims. Allen 
Steel cross-appeals the trial court's refusal to 
enforce its mechanic's lien against the landowners, 
the denial of delay damages against the developers, 
and the refusal of the trial court to hold Equitable 
and Crossroads personally liable for attorney fees. 
Allen Steel docs not appeal the trial court's award 
of attorney fees to the landowners and against 
Allen Steel. Nor does Okiand-Foulger appeal the 
award of attorney fees to Allen Steel. 
I. FACTS 
Equitable and Okiand-Foulger created Crossr-
oads Plaza Associates, a joint venture that U the 
owner of a leasehold interest on which the Cross-
roads Plaza shopping mall, office building, and 
parking garage in Salt Lake City, Utah, are built. 
The real property upon* which the project is 
located consists of separate contiguous parcels of 
realty separately owned at the time this action 
arose by Dcscret Title Holding Corporation, Salt 
Lake City corporation, and various other entities 
('landowners'), each of whom leased its interest to 
Crossroads. 
The joint venture planned to build a 660,000-
square-foot, four-story shopping mall, a sixteen- r{fii 
story office building, and an eight-story, 2,500- / 
cax parking garage complex. The joint venture \J, 
agreement placed responsibility for construction . 
and 'architectural and design* functipns on ^ ^ 
Okiand-Foulger 'to prepare and fmalue comp- ( > 
lete plans and specifications ... subject to being 7* 
approved by the venturers.' For these responsibi- y< 
lities, Okiand-Foulger received a design fee of ' 
approximately SI.4 million, h hired Timmcrman/ 
Stephan Associates to provide architectural serv-
ices for $227,000. 
In the fall of 1977, Okiand-Foulger advertised 
for 'design-build* bids on the structural steej 
work for the Crossroads project, excluding foot-
ings and foundations. Allen Steel bid on the 
project. It was told that the structural steel work 
was to comply with the Uniform Building Code 
(1976 ed.). Allen Steel retained Joseph Patrick, a 
structural engineer, to prepare a preliminary design 
of the tower for bidding purposes and promised to 
pay him $25,000 for the work if Allen Steel 
secured the bid. Patrick prepared a preliminary 
structural design using a hambro joist system, 
wmch was sufficiently detailed to allow Allen Steel 
to make a bid. Allen Steel submitted the bid to 
Okiand-Foulger in the form of a proposal dated 
November 1, 1977, and Okiand-Foulger rejected 
it. 
Subsequently. Patrick prepared a second prop-
osal which included three structural alternatives, a 
bar joist system, a hambro joist system, and a 
composite metal deck system. Allen Steel submi-
tted the second proposal to Okiand-Foulger on 
January 11, 1978. The bid proposal made clear 
that the 'Owner's engineer* was to accept overall 
•responsibility for the design.* It provided, in 
part; 
This proposal is offered for the 
design, fabrication, and ejection of the 
Structural Elements only for the Tower 
and Mall- The following design para-
meters have been used for the struct-
ural design suggested by our engineers 
to compute the price, Owner's engineer 
is to check this design and make 
changes if necessary to enable him to 
accept overall responsibility for design. 
Changes that effect [sic] quantity, 
weight, or complexity of structural 
members will require an adjustment in 
price. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In March, 1978, Allen Steel met with Okland-
Fou.lger, and Okiand-Foulger indicated that the 
composite metal deck alternative had been chosen. 
Allen Steel reduced its unit price. On March 3, 
I97fi, Okiand-Foulger sent a letter to Alien Steel, 
stating: 
This letter is to inform you of our 
intent, upon the closing of the constr-
uction loan for Crossroads Plaza, to 
enter into an agreement with Allen 
Steel Company, to provide the struct-
ural steel and metal deck for' said 
project, in accordance with your pro-
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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posal 
We understand, in turn, that Allen 
Steel will make tentative agreements 
with their suppliers at this time, to 
insure that the above mentioned pro-
posal will be maintained 
It is of some significance that on March 4, 1978, 
Joseph Patrick wrote to Okland-Foulger, offe-
ring to provide engineering services in connection 
with the footing foundation of the project, and 
Okland-Foulger accepted his offer 
In June, 1978, Okland-Foulger authorized 
Allen Steel to begin detailing, i c , preparing det-
ailed template-hkc plans for the fabncation of 
steel Throughout this time, Joseph Patrick 
worked on the design and consulted from tunc to 
time with both Allen Steel and Okland-Foulger. 
The design prepared by Patnck included a reinf-
orced concrete mat that served as the foundation 
for the tower The design also included a struct-
ural steel design and a concrete shear wall The 
shear wall consisted of a concrete shaft formed by 
two bracket-shaped structures facing each other 
and joined together with structural steel to make a 
rectangular reinforcing framework thirty feet 
square and extending the enure height of the bui-
lding The shear wall was to house the elevator 
shaft and resist lateral forces imposed on the bui-
lding by either wind or earthquake 
On August 1, 1978, Allen Steel submitted the 
completed detail drawings to Okland-Foulger for 
approval, and Okland-Foulger submitted the 
design drawings to Equitable for review Equit-
ablc's engineer questioned some areas of the 
design, and as a result, the concrete mat was inc-
reased in thickness by one foot Although Equit-
able did not formally approve or disapprove the 
plans, Okland-Foulger authorized Allen Steel to 
proceed with fabrication based on the plans. 
Dunng the course of construction, Okland-
Foulger dealt directly wrth Patrick regarding con-
crete tests, weld tests, elevator area design, tenant 
improvements, and other details In its findings of 
fact, the trial court found that Patnck performed 
some of his functions at the request of Allen Steel, 
others at the request of Okland-Foulger, and 
others at the request of both Generally, however, 
Patrick's manner of performing the work and his 
hours and places of work were not controlled by 
either Allen Steel or Okland-Foulger Okland-
Foulger delivered a proposed subcontract form to 
Allen Steel on September 5, 1978 Robert Allen of 
Allen Steel stated that he would have his attorney 
review the document and then he would sign it, 
but the agreement was never signed 
Some two weeks later, on September 20, 1978, 
Allen Steel received a letter from Utah American 
Steel Company, which was fabricating the steel 
members, questioning the design of the structure, 
and on October 9, 1978, Allen Steel spoke to 
Patrick regarding the structural design and showed 
him the letter from Utah American Steel At that 
time, Patnck showed Allen Steel a letter from the 
Salt Lake City Engineer's office questioning the 
design The same day, a meeting was held between 
Salt Lake City Corporation and Okland-Foulger 
in which the City questioned the design but agreed 
to allow Okland-Foulger to continue construction 
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upon the posting of a bond 
Salt Lake City halted construction of the Cros-
sroads Plaza Tower on October 16, 1978, because 
of inadequacies it believed existed in the design of 
the structure The basic defect according to an 
engineer hired by the City was that the shear uall 
did not compi) with the Uniform Building Cade 
At that time, eight stories had been erected 
Okland-Foulger hired Glen Enke to provide a 
remedial engineering design to correct the defect 
Allen Steel and Okland-Foulger agreed that Allen 
Steel would finish the contract and perform the 
remedial work Pursuant to Glen Enke's revised 
design, work commenced in March, 1979, and the 
tower was finished in January, 1980 The revision 
required strengthening and enlarging the base 
plates and the stee! column and beam connections 
so that seismic forces would be absorbed through 
the steel structure itself In the process, three pre-
viously erected stones of reinforced steel had to be 
torn down 
Okland-Foulger continued regular progress 
payments to Allen Steel until Allen Steel compl-
eted performance of the project and then withheld 
the final $579,294 payment owed Allen Steel 
Okland-Foulger also asserted a backcharge of 
over $2,000,000 for losses due to the expense and 
delay of redesigning and reconstructing the stiuc-
tural elements of the project Allen Steel filed a 
hen in May, 1980, within eighty days of Okland-
Foulgcr's refusal to pay the amount due on the 
contract and thereafter initiated this action to 
collect the balance due on its contract with Okland-
Foulger or, in the alternative, to collect firom 
Equitable, Crossroads, and the landowners based 
upon their failure to provide payment bonds. 
Crossroads, Equitable, and Okland-Foulger filed 
counterclaims against Allen Steel, asserting both 
an offset against Allen Steel's claims and an ind-
ependent ground for recovery of damages based 
on the defective design of the tower structure 
Equitable filed a cross-claim against Okland-
Foulger, seeking damages for the defective design 
from Okland-Foulger pursuant to the joint 
venture agreement between them 
For purposes of this lawsuit only, the parties 
stipulated that the design of the structural elements 
of the tower section of the Crossroads project did 
not comply with the Uniform Building Code (1976 
Ed ) and fell below the ordinary standard of care 
for structural engineers in the Salt Lake County, 
Utah area during 1977 and 1978 in the following 
specific respects 
(a) The design was not adequate to 
accommodate and withstand lateral 
(including torsional) forces induced by 
seismic and wind forces 
(b) The design of the manner by which 
the two halves of the shear wall were 
connected together was not adequate to 
enable the two halves of the shear wall, 
as a connected unit, to withstand shear 
forces induced by seismic or wind 
forces. 
(c) The mat footing for the tower str-
ucture was not sufficiently stiff to 
resist overturning forces induced in the 
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mat footing by the shear wall (which 
was connected to the mat footing) 
when the shear wall itself is subjected 
to horizontal forces 
A non-jury trial commenced in June, 1984 
During trial, the court ordered the issue of 
damages to be severed and tried separately after 
the determination of the liability issues Following 
a month-long trial, the trial court entered find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law The court held 
that the contract between Allen Steel and Okland-
Fouiger was embodied in Allen Steel's January 11, 
1978 proposal to Okland-Foulger The trial court 
also concluded that the language in the contract 
'effectively excluded any warranty for the design 
Therefore, Allen Steel is not liable to Okland-
Foulger or Crossroads Plaza Associates for breach 
of contract * The trial court further held that 
"Joseph Patrick was an independent contractor 
and Allen Steel is not liable in tort to Okland-
Foulger for his negligence * Based on these 
conclusions, the trial court ruled that "Allen Steel 
satisfactorily completed its contract and is entitled 
to be paid for its work * The court entered a 
judgment in favor of Allen Steel m the amount of 
$579,294 plus interest and against Crossroads 
Plaza Associates, Equitable, and Okland-Foulger 
and dismissed defendants' counterclaims against 
Allen Steel for an offset and damages for negligent 
design 
The court held Crossroads Plaza Associates and 
Equitable liable for their failure to furnish a 
payment bond for the project The court also 
ruled that Allen Steel's mechanic's lien was valid 
as against defendants Okland-Foulger, Equitable, 
and Crossroads and authorized Allen Steel to 
foreclose its hen securing the contract balance The 
court also held that Allen Steel could not enforce 
its hen against the landowners' property because 
they were not parties to a contract with Allen Steel 
and there was no evidence that they would benefit 
from the construction of the project at the end of 
the leases The trial court also entered a judgment 
for attorney fees in favor of Allen Steel and 
against the developers and in favor of the lando-
wners and against Allen Steel 
On appeal, Okland Foulger, Equitable, and 
Crossroads assert that the trial court erred in 
holding that (!) Allen Steel was not liable for 
breach of warranty, and (2) Allen Steel was not 
liable for negligence in providing a defective 
design Allen Steel asseru on cross-appeal that 
(1) it was entitled to a mechanic's hen against the 
fee interests of the landowners, (2) the trial court 
erred in denying delay damages to Allen Steel, and 
(3) the judgment should state unambiguously that 
Equitable and Crossroads are personally liable for 
attorney fees 
II. FINALITY 
After oral argument, the Court requested the 
panics to submit supplemental briefs on the vali-
dity of the trial court's certification of the judg-
ment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure That rule provides in pertinent part 
When more than one claim for relief 
and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry 
of a final judgment as to one or more 
but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determi-
nation by the court that there is no just 
reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment 
Even though a judgment is certified pursuant to 
Rule 54 and all parties pursue the appeal, that is 
not sufficient to confer jurisdiction Olson v SaJt 
Lake City School District, 724 P 2d 960, 964 
(Utah 1986), held that 'acquiescence of the parties 
is insufficient to confer jurisdiction * It is essential 
that the ruling "wholly dispose of the claim or the 
party* to be certified as final and appealable under 
Rule 54(b) 724 P 2d at 964, see also Pate v 
Marathon Steel Co , 692 P 2d 765 (Utah 1984) 
All the claims between Allen Steel and defend-
ants were fully and finally litigated Allen Steel 
won on us claim against defendants Crossroads, 
Okland-Foulger, and Equitable and on the cou-
nterclaims against it Allen Steel lost on its hen 
claim against the landowner defendants There still 
remain, however, (1) Equitable's damages on its 
cross<laim against Okland-Foulger, and (2) the 
amount of attorney fees due Allen Steel and the 
landowners Equitable's claim against Okland-
Foulger is a separate, independent claim filed as a 
cross-claim, to which Allen Steel is not a party 
The question here is whether the unresolved atto-
rney fee issues with respect to Allen Steel's judg-
ment and the landowner's judgment against Allen 
Steel make those judgments nonfinal under Rule 
14(b) 
Not one of our previous cases has expressly 
ruled on the specific issue of whether the deferral 
of awarding attorney fees makes a judgment 
nonfinal and therefore noncertifiable under Rule 
54(b) See, eg , Elder v Tnax Co , 740 P 2d 1320 
(Utah 1987), Anvca Mut Ins v Schettler, 738 
P 2d 641 (Utah 1987), Olson v Salt Uke Cuy 
School Dist, 724 P 2d %0 (Utah 1986), General 
Motors Acceptance Corp v Martinez, 712 P 2d 
243 (Utah 1985) See generally, Williams v Statet 
716 P 2d 806 (Utah 1986), Pate v Marathon Steel 
C o , 692 P 2d 765 (Utah 1984) 
Rule 54(b) is identical in all material respects to 
the corresponding federal rule, and in construing 
our rules, we look to authorities which have inte-
rpreted the federal rule Olson, 724 P 2d at 965 
n 5, Pate, 692 P 2d at 767 n 1 At federal law, a 
pending claim for attorney fees does not make a 
judgment on the menu, nonappealable See Bcaudry 
Motor Co v Abko Properties, Inc , 780 
F2d 751, 755 (9th C\t), cert denied, 479 U S 
825 (1986) ('Rule 54(b) has no application to 
motions for attorneys' fees *), Exchange Nar'i 
Bank v Daniels, 763 F 2d 286, 292, a/Td on 
rehearing, 768 F 2d 140 (7th Or 1985) CIA) 
judgment on the merits is appealable--
independently of Rule 54(b)-despu« the fact 
that questions of fees remain •) 
The trial court here ruled that the issue of att-
orney fees could 'best be determined after the 
rights and liabilities of the parties are finally det-
ermined either by appeal or expiration of appeal 
time * A similar observation was made in Cine-
rama, Inc v Sweet Music, S A , 482 F 2d 66, 70 
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n.2(2dCir. 1973): 
Delaying a decision on counsel fees 
until after the merits of a case have 
been finally determined on appeal may 
place a claim for attorneys' fees 'in 
much better perspective,* Sprague v. 
Ticonic National Bank, [307 U.S. 161, 
168 (1939)1; the benefit achieved by an 
attorney, the skill he has exhibited in 
obtaining it, and the total hours he has 
labored are more readily assessable 
after the appellate process has run its 
course. Moreover, the fact that the 
amount of a counsel fee award may 
turn on such factors provides support 
for the view that the claim for counsel 
fees arises out of a separate transaction 
or occurrence. 
Furthermore, the award of attorney fees usually 
includes attorney fees incurred on appeal as well as 
at trial. Thus, an actual award of attorney fees 
need not be reduced to judgment to make the 
judgment final for appeal purposes since the fee* 
awarded will often include the fees incurred on the 
appeal. In White v.. New Hampshire Department 
of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445, 451-52 
(1982), the Court stated: 
[Tine court's decision of entitlement to 
fees will ... require an inquiry separate 
from the decision on the merits-an 
inquiry that cannot even commence 
until one party has "prevailed.* Nor 
can attorney's fees fairly be characte-
rized as an element of 'relief' indisti-
nguishable from other elements.... 
Their award is uniquely separable from 
the cause of action to be proved at 
trial. 
It follows that even though Allen Steel and the 
landowners may still move for a determination of 
the amount of attorney fees Qwed them under 
judgments now on appeal, this appeal nonetheless 
arises out of a final judgment properly certified 
under Rule 54(b). 
HI. DESiGN-BUILD CONTRACTS 
This Court has not previously considered a dispute 
involving a 'design-build* contract. A basic 
explanation of those contracts is necessary to 
understand the legal, economic, and business 
environment in which the parties operate when 
they enter into such a contract and how and why 
the parties deal as they do and with what expect-
ations. In its findings, the trial court entered this 
brief explanation of design-build contracts: 
'Design build' or 'design construct* is 
a term used in the construction indu-
stry to denote a method of construc-
tion whereby a contractor or subcont-
ractor provides both the design and the 
construction of a particular system in 
the project. The term is not inflexible, 
however, and can mean either that the 
contractor has or has not assumed the 
ultimate responsibility for the design, 
and this can vary from project to 
project. 
(Emphasis added.) 
A design-build construction contract consists 
of an arrangement between an owner and a single 
entity for the design and construction of a project, 
as contrasted with the traditional construction 
process which separates the design and the const-
ruction functions. Bynum, Construction Manage-
ment and Design-Buiid/Fast Track Construction 
From the Perspective of a Genera] Contractor, 46 
Law & Contemp. Probs. 25, 34 (1983) [hereinafter 
Bynum]. The single entity frequently consists of a 
joint venture between an architect or engineer and 
a general contractor, a design-build firm which 
employs both design personnel and contractors, or 
a general contracting firm which subcontracts 
design work to an architect or engineer. Id. Under 
design-build contracts, owners need only look to 
one entity for performance. As a result, such 
contracts have become increasingly attractive to 
owners. Id. They also appeal to design-build 
contractors because the contractor is entitled to 
both design fees and construction profits. Because 
design-build contracts expedite construction, bids 
may be made on a "cost-plus' basis, which is 
generally less risky for the contractor than a fixed 
price contract. Id. 
Similarly, although design-build projects may 
involve building phases similar to traditional con-
tracts, with the design documents first being 
completely prepared and thereafter approved by 
the owner, many design-build jobs involve "fast 
track" construction, where the designing and 
construction are completed simultaneously in 
phases. Id. "Fast track' construction may save 
substantial time, thereby reducing financing costs 
and minimiiing the impact of inflation. Id. That is 
especially true where rapid inflation causes (the 
actual costs of building materials to outstrip esti-
mated costs under ordinary bidding practices, 
thereby producing great risks for subcontractors. 
Just as allocation of responsibility' under design-
build contracts differs from the traditional model, 
the allocation of liability also diverges from the 
traditional model. "It is axiomatic that under a 
design-build contract the contractor assumes, in 
the absence of limiting or exculpating contractual 
provisions, liability for design deficiencies.' Id. at 
36; see also Mobile Housing Environments v. 
Barton and Barton, 432 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D. 
Colo. 1977). As a result, 'most substantial design-
build firms attempt to negotiate contractual limits 
on their liability." Bynum, at 36. This is frequently 
accomplished through clauses excluding liability 
for consequential damages or by carrying, at the 
owners' expense, broad form builders' risk poli-
cies. Id. 
Since design-build contracts are creatures of 
general contract law, the allocation and scope of 
the rights, duties, and responsibilities under the 
contract must be determined by reference to the 
terms of the contract and agreement between the 
parties. As the trial court indicated, the percept-
ions and understandings of the parties may vary 
from project to project. The importance of the 
contractual arrangement is explained by an anal-
ogous discussion of architect liability: 
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Now that architectural relationship! 
take so many forms, a u much more 
appropriate to allocate risks on the 
basis of the parties* contracts as 
modified by their later conduct. 
.. Even if the suit u brought in tort, 
the result will be the same since cont-
ract interpretation ts infected with the 
ton standard of reasonable care, and 
the existence of a ton duty u contro-
lled by the contractual undertakings. 
... Few duties can reasonably be 
imposed in all contexts because the 
architect's construction responsibilities 
now vary greatly In general, the fre-
quency of departures from the traditi-
onal model makes it appropriate to 
regard the problem as one of contract 
interpretation and thus to look to the 
parlies' reasonable expectations. 
Note, Architectural Malpractice A Contract-
Based Approach, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1075, 1083-90 
(1979) (footnotes omitted) 
Since the transition from the traditional alloca-
tion of responsibility to the design-build model is 
likely to result in a wide variety of understandings 
between parties, the particular agreement between 
the parties is best defined by the terms of the 
agreement within the context of the arrangement 
worked out by the various parties 
IV. BREACH OF WARRANTY 
A design flaw caused the damages in this case. 
That is conceded The principal issue in this 
lawsuit is whether the subcontractor^ Allen Steel, 
was liable for the basic design of the project under 
the terms of us design-build contract with 
Okland-Foulger, notwithstanding a disclaimer of 
us liability, or whether Okland-Foulger was 
liable. The trial court held that the joint venture 
agreement between Okland-Foulger and Allen 
Steel obligated Okland-Foulger to design the 
project and placed 'responsibility* for the design 
on Okland-Foulger. 
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that 
*[t]he contract between Allen Steel and Okland-
Foulger is the proposal of January 11, 1978 as 
orally modified The only modifications included 
provisions as to time, selection of alternative two 
[a composite metal deck], and a reduction in 
price * Okland-Foulger asserts that the trial court 
erred in that ruling and in not ruling that a prop-
osed subcontract agreement dated September 5, 
1978, embodied the contract. 
The trial court's findings of fact on that point 
are based on substantial evidence and are not 
clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Okland-Foulger first contends that it did not 
accept Allen Steel's January 11, 1978 proposal. A 
binding contract exists only when there has been 
mutual assent by the parties to be bound by the 
terms of their agreement Bunncl v. Bills* 13 Utah 
2d 83, 368 P 2d 597 (1962). The trial court, 
however, specifically found that Okland-Foulger 
did assent: 
A; a meeting held in early March of 
1978, the January II proposal was 
a c c e p t e d by O k l a n d - F o u l g e r 
Company with certain modifications, 
although the document was never 
signed and was not intended by the 
parties as an integration. The compo-
site metal deck alternative was selected 
and the unit price was modified Some 
provisions regarding time were also 
modified. 
.. On March 3, 1978, Okland-
Foulger sent a letter (letter of intent, 
Exhibit 42) to Allen Steel indicating its 
intent to enter into an agreement for 
Allen Steel to provide the structural 
steel for the project 'in accordance 
with your (Allen Steel's) proposal " 
This refers to the January 11, 1978 
proposal. 
The evidence clearly supports the findings. Mr. 
Hendnk Van Rensburg, executive vice-president 
of Allen Steel, testified that at the March 1 
meeting, Alien Steel regarded the January proposal 
as valid Likewise, Okland-Foulger's March 3, 
1978 letter clearly suggests that Okland-Foulger 
considered the proposal a valid agreement The 
letter reads as follows. 
This letter is to inform you of our 
intent, upon the closing of the constr-
uction loan for Crossroads Plaza, to 
enter into an agreement with Allen 
Steel Company, to provide the struct-
ural steel and metal deck for said 
project, in accordance with your pro-
posal. 
We understand, in turn, that Allen 
Steel will make tentative agreements 
with their suppliers at this time, to 
insure that the above mentioned pro-
posal will be maintained. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Okland-Foulger asserts that it did not agree to 
the language of the January 11 proposal that the 
owners* engineer was "to check this design and 
make changes if necessary to enable him to accept 
overall responsibility for the design * There is, 
however, substantial evidence which supports the 
trial court's conclusion that both parties knew of 
and accepted those terms in the January 11 prop-
ositi Allen Steel clearly intended those terms to be 
part of the agreement, and did so from the begi-
nning, in an October, 1977 meeting, Robert Allen, 
president of Allen Steel, William Howe of Allen-
Howe Specialties Corporation, and Hcndrik Van 
Rensburg discussed Allen Steel's initial proposal 
for the Crossroads project. William Howe's notes 
of the meeting record the decision that Allen Steel 
should bid Joseph Patrick's design but that the 
owner, and not Allen Steel, must take responsibi-
lity for the design Mr Howe's handwritten notes 
state: 
10/31 fll Crossroads Plaza 
RBA [Robert Alien! 
Van [Hendnk Van Rensburg] 
ok to Bid struct pnee erected - to a 
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design suggested by JT* f Joe Patrick) 
Don't want resp. for design. 
Owner must hire engineer A take 
resp. 
for design & review ours 
Money in our bid to pay Joe for 
prelim, design. 
1. Owners Engr to check design & take 
resp.... 
2. [Alternative of hiring engineer 
crossed out.J if object - owner 
issues sep contr to Joe 
Accordingly, the November 1, 1977 proposal 
stated: 
The following design parameters have 
been used for the structural design 
suggested by our engineers to compute 
the price. Owner's engineer is to check 
this design and make changes if nece-
ssary to enable him to accept overall 
responsibility for design. Changes that 
affect quantity, weight, or complexity 
of strucrural members will require an 
adjustment in price. 
Okland-Foulger contends that during a meeting 
attended by Mr. Van Rensburg and George Mar-
quardt of Allen Steel, Bill Howe, and either or 
both Jack and Randy OkJand, Sid Foulger told 
Allen Steel that this language in the November 1 
proposal was unacceptable. The trial court found 
otherwise, based on contrary evidence. Mr. Mar-
quardt, Mr. Howe, Mr. Vac Rensburg, and Jack 
and Randy Okland all testified that Mr. Foulger of 
Okland-Foulger did not object to that language. 
George Marquardt testified that no one told him 
that the January 11 proposal language was unac-
ceptable. Mr. Van Rensburg and Mr. Howe also 
testified that no objection was raised to the prop-
osal language in the November 1 proposal or the 
January 11 proposal at any time. Jack Okland 
testified that he had not seen the November 1 
proposal prior to his 1982 deposition and that he 
did not attend any meeting with Bill Howe. Randy 
Okland testified that he did not bear anyone 
object to Allen Steel's proposal language. 
Allen Steel's November proposal was not acce-
pted, and Allen Steel submitted a new proposal, 
the January 11 proposal, which provided two 
additional structural alternatives and included the 
same disclaimer of design responsibility. Okland-
Foulger accepted the latter proposal by its March 3 
letter. Although Okland-Foulger asserts that it 
rejected the November proposal because of the 
disclaimer, the trial court apparently believed the 
testimony of Mr. Van Rensburg that Okland-
Foulger rejected the November proposal because it 
wanted alternatives to the hambro joint structural 
system, not because of any objection to the discl-
aimer. 
Okland-Foulger also asserts that the language 
of the January 11 agreement is of no effect 
because it was superseded by the September 5 
subcontract. The trial court found that Allen Steel 
received the proposed agreement from Okland-
Foulger and that Robert Allen of Allen Steel 
agreed to sign it after his attorney had reviewed it 
1
 and concluded it was not objectionable; but no 
I one signed or accepted the September 5 proposed 
1
 subcontract. Okland-Foulger does not deny that 
Allen Steel's attorney was to review that .subcon-
tract or that no one signed it. 
Acceptance of t contract 'requires manifestation 
of unconditional agreement to all of the terms of 
I the offer and an intention to be bound thereby.... 
[ItJ must be clear, positive and unambiguous.' RJ. 
Daum Constr. Co. v. Child. 122 Utah 194, 
j 200, 247 P.2d 817, 819-20 (1952) (citations 
omitted). Allen Steel's promise to review the 
document and to sign it was not an acceptance and 
did not obligate Allen Sted to sign the document 
if the proposed agreement were unsatisfactory. 
Even if the parties intended to integrate or form-
alize the January U proposal in a subcontract 
agreement, '{tjae fact that part of the perform: 
ance is that the parties will enter into a contract in 
the future does not render the original agreement 
any less binding.' Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 
87, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (1962) (footnote omitted). 
Allen Stee! could, and did, refuse to sign an agr-
eement that it did not believe properly formalized 
the agreement already reached. Moreover, Alien 
Steel's actions did aot indicate an acceptance of 
the proposed subcontract. Allen Stee! continued to 
perform the existing January 11 contract under 
which it had been performing for months. 
In sum, the facts amply support the court's 
findings and legal conclusion that Okland-
Foulger accepted Allen Steel's January II prop-
osal and that the later September proposal did not 
bind the parties because it was not accepted by 
Allen Steel. 
The January II proposal was offered for the 
'design, fabrication, and erection of the Structural 
Elements only for the Tower and Mall* <emphasis 
mdded). The proposal also provided that the 
"following design parameters have been used for 
the structural design suggested by our {i.e., Allen 
Steel'sJ engineers to compute the price. Owner's 
engineer is to check this design and make changes 
if necessary to enable him to accept overall resp-
onsibility for design' (emphasis added). That 
'overall responsibility' included compliance with 
the Uniform Building Code. 
The trial court also found as a matter of fact 
that Okland-Foulger provided Allen Steel with 
general design parameters and that Okland-
Foulger relied upon Allen Steel to provide the 
design of the structure. In addition, the trial court 
found that Allen Steel knew that the structural 
aspects of the project were 'to be constructed in 
conformity with the Uniform Building Code (1976 
Edition), and standards appropriate in Seismic 
Zone HI.' 
The trial court ruled, however, as a matter of 
law, that the contract language negated any liabi-
lity on the pan of Allen Steel to Okland-Foulger 
for a design defect. In effect, Allen Steel promised 
to provide a 'working' design which it would use 
for pricing purposes only, and Okland-Foulger 
was obligated to ensure that the desijgp was suffi-
cient and that it would comply with code and 
safety requirements. 
These conclusions require us to decide whether a 
party to a contract may agree to provide a design 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
CODE*GO Allen Steel Co. v. Crossroads Plaza Associates 
*™°. Utah 119 Utah Adv Rep. 6 . 1 3 
for a construction project which is to conform to 
the Uniform Building Code and in the same con-
tract preclude liability to the other party for 
breach of warranty for failure to conform by a 
contract term that the other party to the contract 
is to accept overall responsibility for the design. 
A . Express W&rrunty 
As defined by 17A C.J.S. Contracts §342, at 325 
(1963), a warranty "is an assurance by one party 
to a contract of the existence of a fact upon which 
the other party may rely. It is intended to relieve 
the promisee of any duty to ascertain the fact for 
himself ....* (Footnotes omitted.) No specific 
language is required to create a warranty. For one 
parry to be held to a warranty in a contract, the 
natural tendency of the statement must be to 
induce a party to enter into the transaction. Wel-
chman v. Wood, 10 Utah 2d 325, 329, 353 P.2d 
165, 168 (1960). "Express warranties are construed 
according to the clear and natural import of the 
language used ...." 17A C.J.S. Contracts §342, at 
327. 
Although the January 11 contract contains spe-
cific reference to the Uniform Building Code, it 
does not contain a specific or express covenant 
that the structural design will conform to the 
Code. To the contrary, the contract states precisely 
the reason for the reference to the Building Code; 
and the reason, in the context of a design-build 
contract, makes eminent good sense, i.e., that the 
Code is one of the 'design parameters' used by 
Allen SteelV engineers "to compute the price.* 
Such language does not create an express warranty 
that the design will conform to the Code. 
B. Implied Warranty 
As a general rule, courts -do not imply a warranty 
unless there is a representation relied upon which 
is the basis for the bargain. See, -e.g., Atlas 
Constr. Co. v. Aqua Drilling Co., 559 P.2d 39 
^Wyo. 1977). Nevertheless, an implied warranty 
may exist because of the conduct of the parties. Moore 
v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P.2d 221 
(1956). Beyond that, this Court has recognized in 
the context of construing a building contract, that 
"(ilnsofar as a municipal ordinance is applicable to 
a contract, it is by operation of law an implied 
term of that contract.* Quagliana v. Exquisite 
Howe Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301,, 308 (Utah 
1975); see also St. Joseph Hosp. v. Corbetta 
Constr. Co., 21 111. App. 3d 925, 316 N.E.2d 51 
(1974); Bon v. Moser, 175 Va. 11, 7 S.E.2d 217 
(1940); Bebb v. Jordan, 111 Wash. 73, 189 P. 553 
(1920). 
Thus, a warranty that the design of a building 
will conform to the building code is generally 
implied by operation of law in a contract to design 
a building. The rationale for the rule is that an 
architect or other design professional is 'bound to 
know the building restrictions of the designated 
place, and draw the plans and specifications acc-
ordingly.* Bon, 175 Va. at 15, 7 S.E.2d at 218. 
Nevertheless, a warranty will not be implied where 
the contract expressly negates or disclaims such a 
warranty. Fredrickson £ Watson Constr. Co. v. 
Department of Public Works, 28 Cal. App. 3d 
514, 104 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1972). Parties should be 
allowed to make any bargain they wish, including 
one excluding any warranty. See AES Technology 
Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation. 583 F.2d 933 
(7th Cir. 1978); cf. United States v. Bethlehem 
Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907). It is not the role of 
the courts to rewrite contracts between parties 
i possessing equaJ bargaining power. See Universal 
Drilling Co. v. Camay Drilling Co., 737 F.2d 869. 
874 (10th Cir. 1984). 
There is no contention that the parties possessed 
such disparate bargaining power that the agree-
ment was unfairly coerced. Okland-Foulger had 
the clear-cut duty' under the plain language of the 
January II agreement to check the structural 
design submitted by Allen Stee! and to assume 
overall responsibility' for it. The trial court corre-
ctly concluded that this language imposed respo-
nsibility on Okland-Foulger for the adequacy of 
the design and negated Allen Steel's liability, at 
least as between the parties, for that design. To 
conclude otherwise would nullify the express lan-
guage of the agreement* between the parties. This 
conclusion is also supported by ample parol evid-
ence adduced at trial. In all events, the trial court 
did not commit clear error in reaching the concl-
usion it did. 
Contractual disclaimers may, however, be disa-
llowed if they conflict with 'some consideration of 
public policy.' Walker Bank £ Trust Co. v. First 
Security Corp., 9 Utah 215, 220, 341 P.2d 944, 
947 (1959). Okland-Foulger argues that if we 
construe the language of the January 11 proposal 
to preclude Allen Steel's liability for breach of 
warranty, such a <iisclaimer violates the public 
policy of this state against disclaimers of liability 
for negligence in the performance of construction. 
Utah Code Ann. §13-8-1 (1986) prohibits 
agreements in construction contracts to indemnify 
the indemnitee 'against liability for damages 
arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage 
to property caused by or resulting from the sole 
negligence of the [indemnitee]. * 
Section 13-8-1 does not apply here. In the 
first place, the January 11 agreement does not 
provide for indemnification at all. Furthermore, 
the statute prohibits indemnification for tort liab-
ility' resulting from consequential damages for 
bodily injury or damage to property. The provi-
sion does not include contract damages for rectif-
ying a failure to meet specifications. 
In sum, the contract language that the owner's 
engineer was to check the design 'to enable him to 
accept overall responsibility for design* negated 
the existence of a warranty by Allen Steel. 
V. CONTRACTORS BOND STATUTE 
Equitable and Crossroads argue that although the 
trial court may have correctly niled that Okland-
Foulger was personally liable under the January 11 
agreement for the remaining payment due to Allen 
Steel, Equitable and Crossroads are not personally 
liable to Allen Stee! because they were not parties 
to the agreement between Allen Steel and Okland-
Foulger. We affirm the trial court's conclusion 
and bold that Crossroads and Equitable, as 
lessees, are personally liable to Allen Steel based 
on their failure to furnish a contractor's bond for 
the project in compliance with Utah Code Ann. 
§14-2-2(1973). 
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The contractor's bond statute in effect a: the 
time of the relevant events required the owner of 
improved property to obtain a bond tc guarantee 
payment of subcontractors and materialmen if the 
genera] contractor fails to pay them* 
The owner of an> interest ic land ent-
ering into a contract, involving $2,000 
or more, for the construction addition 
to. or alteration or repair of, any bui-
lding, structure or improvement upon 
land shall, before an> such work is 
commenced, obtain from the contra-
ctor a bond in a sum equal to the 
contract price, -with food and sufficient 
sureties, conditioned for the faithful 
performance of the contract and 
prompt payment for materia] furnished 
and labor performed under the cont-
ract. Such bond shall run to the owner 
and to al! other persons as their inte-
rest ma> appear; and an> person who 
has furnished materials or performed 
labor for or upon any such building, 
structure or improvement, payment for 
which has not been made, shall have a 
direct right of action against the sure-
ties upon such bond for the reasonable 
value of the materials furnished or 
labor performed, not exceeding, 
however, in any case the prices agreed 
upon; which right of action shall 
accrue forty days after the completion, 
or abandonment, or default in the 
performance, of the work provided for 
in the contract. 
"Hie bond herein provided So: shall 
be exhibited to any person interested, 
upon request. 
Utah Code Ann. §14-2-1 (Supp. 1977). If a 
bond is noi obtained, the "owner" is personally 
liable to all materialmen and subcontractors who 
have cot been paid. That liability was established 
bere by Utah Code Ann. §14-2-2 (1973): 
Any person subject to the provisions 
of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain 
such good and •sufficient bond, or to 
exhibit the same, as herein required, 
shall be personally liable to all persons 
who have furnished materials or perf-
ormed labor under the contract for the 
reasonable value of such materials 
furnished or labor performed, not 
exceeding, however, in any case the 
prices agreed upon. Actions to recover 
on such liability shall be commenced 
within one year from the last date the 
last materials were furnished or the 
labor performed. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The owners of a leasehold, or tenants under a 
lease, are 'owners* of an interest in land under 
§14-2-1 and §14-2-2. King Bros. v. Utah 
Dry Kiln Co., 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 P.2d 17 (1968); 
Metals Mfg. Co. \. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 
2d 74, 395 P.2d 914 (1964); Buehner Block Co. v. 
Ciezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517 (1957). The 
Crossroads joint venture agreement between 
tfkland-Foulger and Equitable provided that 
1 Okiand-Foulger, in its individual capacity, would 
act as the general contractor overseeing the impr-
ovements. But the joint venture itself, Crossroads, 
had the duty to obtain a bond from the general 
contractor, Okiand-Foulger, to ensure payment 
of materialmen and subcontractors such as Allen 
Steel. We therefore conclude that Equitable, 
Okland-Foulger, and Crossroads are personally 
liable tc Allen Steel under the contractor's bond 
statute because of their failure to procure a cont-
ractor's bond. 
On the other hand, the landowners/lessors are 
aot liable under the contractor's bond statute 
because they did not enter "into a contract ... for 
the construction ... or improvement upon land." 
Utah Code Ann. §14-2-1 (Supp. 1977). Furt-
hermore, because of the common purpose of the 
mechanic's lien statutes (§§38-1-1 to 38-1-
2£) and contractor's bond statutes (§§14-2-1 
and 14-2-2) and their practically identical lan-
guage, adjudications as to what is lienable under 
the former are helpful in determining the proper 
application of the latter. King Bros. v. Utah Dry 
Kiln Co.. 21 Utah 2d at 46, 440 P.2d at 19. In 
light of our discussion infra affirming the trial 
court's finding that the landowners/lessors are 
not liable under the mechanic's lien statute, that is 
an additional reason wh> the landowners/lessors 
are not liable under the contractor's bond statute. 
VI. NEGLIGENCE 
The trial court concluded that "Allen Steel is not 
liable in tort to Okland-Foulger for (Joseph 
Patrick's] negligence.* First, defendants assert 
that Allen Steel is liable ic negligence for the def-
ective design of the tower. They state ihat the 
design failed to conform with the Uniform Buil-
ding Code. It is well established that to base an 
action in tort, there must be a breach of duty 
apart from the nonperformance of a contract. Aspell 
v. American Contract Bridge League, 122 
Aril. 399, 595 P.2d 191 <Ct. App. 1979); Steiner 
Corp. v. American Dist. Tel., 106 Idaho 787, 6&3 
P,2d 435 <1984). Since the January (1 agreement 
allocated legal responsibilir> for the design of the 
structure to Okland-Foulger* rather than Allen 
Steel, Allen Steel had no contractual duty as to the 
adequacy of the design vis-a-vis Okland-
Fcmlger. 
Neither did Allen Steel violate a statutory duty. 
The existence of a municipal ordinance such as the 
building code does not alter our conclusion. Even 
if Allen Steel were liable under such an ordinance 
to third persons for an unsafe or dangerous design-
-afi issue as to which we express no opinion-
defendants are not -within the class of people the 
statute was intended to protect. See Union Pac. 
Ry. v. McDonald, 152 U.S. 262,283 (1894). 
Defendants also contend that Allen Steel is 
liable under the principle of respondeat superior 
for the negligence of Joseph Patrick in preparing 
the design. However, the trial court concluded that 
Patrick was an independent contractor, and that 
conclusion is ampl> supported by substantial evi-
dence. 
Patrick testified that the onl> agreement between 
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a preliminary design for S25,00C. He also testified 
that Allen Stee! did not hire him to be the engineer 
of record or to prepare a complete structural 
design. Nor did Allen Steel request specifically that 
he design the shear wall. Although Allen Steel 
referred in one letter tc Joseph Patrick as *pur 
ftrucrura.' engineer/ the coun found that* throu-
ghout the summer of 197E, Patrick communicated 
directly with both Allen Stee! and Oklafld-
Foulger. Okland-Foulger dealt directly with 
Patrick regarding such details as concrete te$ts, 
elevator area design, and tenant improvements. 
Patrick performed many functions at the request 
of Allen Steel, many at the request of Okland-
Foulger, and some at the request of both; nevert-
heless, his manner of performing the work, the 
hours, and places of work were determined by bim 
aione. Under lhese circumstances, the trial court 
appropriately found Patrick to be an independent 
contractor. 
Under principles of vicarious liability, an empl-
oyer is not responsible for the negligence of an 
independent contractor. Cleason v. Sair Lake City* 
94 Utah 1, 74 P.2d 1225 (1937). Although an 
exception to this rule exists where an employer 
contractually undertakes control or responsibility 
for a task performed by an independent contra% 
ctor, id., Allen Stee! assumed no such obligation. 
Therefore, the trial coun correctly ruled that Allen 
Stee! was not liable in tort to Okland-Foulger.2 
VII. LANDOWNERS' LIABILITY 
Allen Steel challenges the trial court's conclusion 
that 'Allen Steel's [mechanic's] ben is not valid *$ 
against the landowner defendants because they 
were not parties to any contract with Allen Steel.* 
In particular, Allen Steel challenges the conclusion 
that there is no evidence that the landowners 
would benefit from the construction of the Cros-
sroads project at the end of the leases. 
Interiors Contracting Inc. v. NavaJco, 548 P,2d 
1382, 1386 (Utah 1982), held that 'the mere exis-
tence of a lessor-lessee relationship, without 
more, does not justify charging the lessor's inte-
rest with a mechanic's lien for improvements 
made on the property at the instance of (he 
lessee.' There are, however, occasions when a 
lessor's interest may be subject to a mechanic's 
lien. First, a lessor's property interest may be 
subject to a lien if an agreement, express or 
implied, exists between the lessor or his agent and 
the contractor. Zions First Nat'J Bank v. Carlson, 
23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970). The trial 
coun concluded that there was no agreement 
between Allen Stee! and the landowners regarding 
the construction of Crossroads Tower. Nor is there 
any indication or evidence that Crossroads or 
Equitable were agents of the landowners. 
A second basis tor imposing a mechanic* s lien 
on the fee interest of a landowner may exist if the 
contract between the landowner and the lessee 
requires the lessee to construct improvements that 
enhance the value of the freehold. See Interiors 
Contracting, 648 P.2d at 1388. Even though the 
landowners' leases with Crossroads may have 
required the Crossroads project to be constructed, 
that is not necessarily determinative of whether the 
AAUUUWUCI* interests are suDjecx to tne lien. See Gor-
man i. Birrel!, 41 Utah 274, 125 P. 685 (1912;; 
Morrow v. Mem'rt, 16 Utah 412, 52 P. 667 (1898; 
The lav is that *a lessor is subject to a lien for 
improvements by a tenant if the lease 'requires or 
obligates the tenant to construct improvements which 
substantially enhance the value of the fret-
bold . . . " Interiors Contracting, 648 P.2d at I 3 r 
(citing Utley *. Wear, 333 S.W.2d 787 (Mo. a . 
App. I960) (emphasis in original). 
Thus, for a lien to exist against the lessor's 
interest, the value of the lessor's interest must be 
substantially enhanced. Ordinarily, improvements 
will enhance the value of an interest in land only if 
the value of the improvements extend beyond the 
life of the lease. The landowners' leases with 
Crossroads have a primary term of 62 years and 
three ! 0-year renewal option periods-a total 
potential lease term of 92 years. 
Allen Steel presented no evidence of the useful 
life of the improvements or their value in either 62 
years or 92 years. The trial coun concluded, as a 
matter of fact: 
There is no evidence that the useful life 
of the improvements extends beyond 
the lease period or that the landowners 
will benefit from the construction of 
the Crossroads Project. 
It follows, as the trial court held, that there is 
no lien against the landowners' fee estate. 
V m . DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT A N D 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Aii«> Steel alsfc c*oss~fc^ ?etJs> tht portion of \ht 
judgment in its favor against Okland-Foulger 
which limited liability for any deficiency judgment 
after foreclosure of the mechanic's lien to Okland-
Foulger. Allen Steel contends that Crossroads and 
Equitable should also be held liable for a defici-
ency judgment.3 The developers, Crossroads and 
Equitable, claim that if they are subject to the 
mechanic's lien law, their financial exposure to 
Allen Steel is limited to their interest in the lien 
property under Utah Code Ann. §38-1-16 
(1988). They argue that they are not personally 
liable to plaintiff under the mechanic's hen law 
because they were not parties to the contract 
between Allen Steel and Okland-Foulger. There 
is, therefore, no basis for holding tnem personally 
liable for attorney fees under the mechanic's lien 
law. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18 (1988) governs the 
assessment of attorney fees in a mechanic's lien 
action and remains unchanged since the events 
underlying this lawsuit: 
In any action brought to enforce any 
lien under this chapter the successful 
party shall be entitled to recover a 
Tt2*on*b\t aftorntyV St*, u> t* fixto, 
by the coun, which shall be taxed as 
costs in the action. 
Equitable and Crossroads concede that even if 
Allen Steel is entitled to attorney fees from funds 
derived from the mechanic's lien foreclosure sale 
under §38-1-18, they arc not personally liable 
for Allen Steel's attorney fees resulting from the 
lien foreclosure action. They contend that §38-1-
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If should be read to be consistent with §38-1- j 
16 (1988). which reads: j 
Ever} person whose claim is not satis-
fied as herein provided ma> have jud- | 
gment docketed for the balance I 
unpaid, and execution therefor against j 
the parry personally ha We. I 
Attorne> fees become pan of the taxable costs in a 
lien foreclosure action pursuant to §38-1-18. 
Section 38-1-16 limits a deficiency judgment, 
which would include attorney fees, to a "parry 
personal!) liable." That term means the person or i 
part) that entered into the contraa which gave rise 
to the furnishing of labor and supplies to improve » 
the reaJ property and is personally liable therefor. 
In sum, we affirm the award of attorney fees. 
We also affirm the trial court's award of a defic-
ient judgment for attorney fees against- Okland-
Foulger. j 
IX. DELAY COSTS 
Allen Steel next argues that it is entitled to a new 
trial on the issue of dela> damages. Since Okland-
Foulger agreed to "accept overall responsibility for 
design" and the trial court found that Allen Steel 
had breached no contractual obligation, Alien 
Steel argues, it was improper to deny plaintiff 
delay damages for defendants' fault in delaying | 
completion of the contraa. We disagree. 
Simpl) because Okland-Foulger accepted 
overall responsibility for design and because Allen 
Steel did not breach its obligation, do not necess- j 
aril) mean that OkJand-Foulger's conduct was I 
the proximate, cause of Allen Steel's damages. 
Paragraph 3 of the trial court's conclusions indi-
cate an independent source of fault for delay: 
Joseph Patrick was an independent j 
contractor and Allen Steel is not liable 
in tort to Okland-Foulger for his I 
negligence, nor is Okland-Foulger 
liable in tort to Allen Steel for 
Patrick's negligence. 
Nor does plaintiff convince us with its sparse 
review on this point that there are 'volumes of 
evidence supporting the decision in favor of Allen 
Steel." Plaintiff does not cite any significant 
portion of the record to sho» that the trial court's 
findings *ere dearl> erroneous. It does not follow 
that the trial court's ruling that Allen Steel is not 
entitled to delay damages was clearl) erroneous 
because the trial court made the finding that the j 
evidence "is insufficient to prove that Okland-
Foulger [and] Equitable ... breached a duty of care 
to adequately review the design." 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
1. We make no ultimate determination of responsi-
bilit) between Okland-Foulger and the engineer, 
Joseph Patrick, or anyone else. Our holding, of 
course, does not extend beyond the facts of this 
case. 
2 The same conclusion applies to the ton countef-
claims of defendants Equitable and Crossroads. 
Allen Stee! owed them no contractual or statutory 
dut) beyond what was owed to Okland-Foulger. 
Furthermore, since the trial court ruled that Joseph 
I Patrick was an independent contractor for whose 
negligence Allen Stee! was not liable to Okland-
Foulger, *e perceive no basis for holding Allen Steel 
liable in tort to Equitable or Crossroads. If anyt-
hing, Equitable and Crossroads may have a cause of 
action against Patrick. 
3 Paragraph seven of the trial court's order of 
I February 13, 1985, gives rise to this appeal. It pro-
vides: "In the event a deficiency may remain in 
satisfaction of Allen Steel's judgment, costs, and 
any attorney's fees it ma) then have been awarded 
after applying all tht proceeds of the foreclosure 
sale, Allen Steel is awarded a deficiency judgment 
against Okland-Foulger." The names of 
"Crossroads Plaza Associates" and "Equitable" are 
lined through, implying that there ma) be no defi-
ciency judgment against Crossroads or Equitable for 
the judgment, costs, or attorney fees under the 
mechanic's lien statute. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring and 
Dissenting) 
I concur in the opinion of Justice Stewart, 
except for that portion which upholds the trial 
court's conclusion that the contraa between the 
parties constituted an express disclaimer of any 
warranty b) Allen Steel that the design met the 
requirements of the Uniform BuDding Code. In 
my view, Allen Steel undertook to satisfy the 
requirements of the Code and breached that pro-
vision of the contraa. 
The trial court found that "the January 11, 
1978, proposal required Allen Steel Company to 
design the ,struauraJ dements* of the tower," 
that the January 11th proposal was 'the contraa 
between Allen Steel" and defendants, that Allen 
Steel knew that its design was to conform to the 
requirements of the Uniform BuDding Code, that 
the struauraJ design provided by Allen Steel pur-
suant to the proposal '(did] not comp!) with the 
Uniform Building Code," and that Okland-
Foulger and Equitable breached no duty of care in 
their review of the defective design. Yet in the face 
of this prima facie finding of a breach of contraa 
by Allen Steel, the trial court concluded as a 
matter of la* that the following language from the 
January 11th proposal "excluded any warranty for 
the design." 
This proposal is offered for the design, 
fabrication, and erection of the struc-
tural elements onl) for the Tower and 
Mall. T^ ie following design parameters 
have been used for the structural 
design suggested by our engineers to 
compute the price. Owner's engineer is 
to check this design,and make changes 
if necessary to enable him to accept 
overall responsibility for design. 
Changes that effect [sic] quality, 
weight, or complexity of structural 
members will require an adjustment in 
price. 
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(Emphasis added) In m> view this language 
cannot accompbsfc the end claimed for it cy the 
tnal court 
I agree with Jusuce Sir*an that parties to a 
construction contract car disclaim liability for a 
design's failure to comph with applicable building 
codes However, J am of th: v>r» that to disclaim 
such a warrant), which Justice Stewart concedes is 
impbed in all contracts to provide designs for 
buildings and which I conclude the trial judge 
found was an express part of the agreement 
between the parties here, the language used must 
be clear and unambiguous Vague generalities 
about 'responsibility* for the design in a bidding 
document will oot suffice to disclaim a responsi-
bility so fundamentally linked xo the furnishing of 
a detailed design See, e g , United States v 
Spcann, 248 U.S 132, 137 (1918), KeUey > Bank 
BJdg and Equip Corp of America, 453 F.2d 774, 
777 (J Oth Or 1972), Jack B Parson Constr Co 
v Utah Dep*t of Transp , 725 P 2d 614, 616-17 
(Utah 1986), Thorn Constr Co v Utah Dcp'i of 
Transp . 598 P 2d 365, 3^-68 (Utah 1*79) 
Because I conclude that the tnal court «rred in 
concluding that the above language operated as a 
disclaimer, I would reverse the portion of the 
judgment that found against defendants on their 
counterclaim against Allen Steel and remand the 
case for further proceedings 
Cue as 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CO-AX ENTERPRISES CORP., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v . 
The TRIAX CO. , a Utah corporation, 
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No. 20033 
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Fourth District, Utah County 
Honorable George E Ballif 
ATTORNEYS: 
Claron C Spencer, Dale E Anderson, Salt 
Lake City, for appellant 
William L Nixon, Alpine, Denver C Snuffer, 
Salt Lake City, for appellee 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Co-Ax Enterprises ('Co-Ax') appeals from a 
judgment of the trial court which held that Co-
Ax failed to prove its breach of contract claim 
brought against The Tnax Company (*Tnax") 
The parties have failed tc make clear the exac 
procedural course of the case IE the tna) court 
Nevertheless we bebeve that the case is subject to 
[ ar appropriate decision and proceed oc the basis 
' of the case as presented in the bnefs 
The United States Nivy contracted in late 1978 
with the <Jefendant, Tnax tc renovate certain 
military housing oc the island or Midway The 
Navy contrac* included provisions tha> Tnax was 
to provide all the materials and equipment neces-
sary for the work tha* the manner o r delivery of 
materials and equipment to the island was the 
choice of Tnax and that the term of the contract 
»as 560 days Ic January of 1979, Tnax submitted 
to the Navy a progress schedule which was appr-
oved .February 10, 1979, calling for the work to be 
completed within a five-month penod 
Tnax subcontracted the labor for the job 
During late 1978 and early 1979 Tnax negotiated 
with the plaintiff, Co-Ax, to provide the labor 
force for all but the plumbing work for the 
project The contract pnee between Tnax and Co-
Ax was determined b> a calculation of the cost of 
labor plus an agreed profu p c month for a penod 
of five months On January 11, 1979, Co-Ax and 
Tnax signed a forma] contract The contract, 
however, -was silent as to the -supply and delivery 
or matenals and equipmen* and the length of time 
for which the labor force was to be supplied by Co-
Ax 
The laborers supplied by Co-Ax amved on the 
island in the first pan of February At the end of 
five months, the renovation of the buildings had 
not been completed and the work had come to a 
standstill because of shortages of matenals due to 
delays in the delivery of matenals and equipment 
The materia! shortages were caused by shipping 
problems Tnax had selected the Military Sea 
Transpon Service as the shipping agent During 
this penod, Co-Ax received payments from Tnax 
on the contract, for the labor performed but 
nothing for the profit which had been agreed 
upon 
Co-Ax's request for additional funds to 
remain on the island for a longer term was refused 
by Tnax, and Co-Ax's construction crew aban-
doned the project The job was completed by a 
new work crew employed by Tnax Subsequently, 
Co-Ax, as the labor subcontractor, sued Tnax, 
contending that the parties had agreed that Co-
Ax would provide the labor source for a five-
month .penod and that Tnax had promised to 
supply matenals and equipment Co-Ax conte-
nded that the inability to complete its work was 
the result o f shortages of matenals and equipment 
due to delays in delivery which were the responsi-
bilry of Tnax Co-Ax sought <iamages for lost 
profits and compensation for tools which had been 
left behind 
Tnax denied that it had agreed to provide mat-
enals and equipment to meet Co-Ax schedules 
and denied that the subcontract was to be compl-
eted within the five-month penod Tnax conte-
nded that the January 11, 1979 wnting was the 
entire agreement between the parties Tnax coun-
terclaimed against Co-Ax, seeking damages for 
the additional employees which it had to hire to 
complete the project 
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conspicuous gap in the workmen's compen-
sation field by furnishing protection 
against death or disability to laborers and 
mechanics employed by contractors or oth-
er persons on Federal property." S.Rep. 
No. 2294, at 1. 
That Congress intended nothing more 
than to provide much-needed coverage to 
these workers is shown by the single re-
vealing item in the scanty legislative histo-
ry of the statute. The House version of 
the bill not only would have extended cov-
erage to these workers, but also would 
have subjected federal property to state 
safety and insurance regulations and would 
have authorized state officers to enter 
upon federal premises in furtherance of 
these aims. The Senate struck out these 
latter provisions at the request of the Exec-
utive Branch of the Federal Government, 
noting expressly that they "would not only 
produce conflicts of authority between 
State and Federal officers but would also 
mark a wide departure from the well-estab-
lished principle that Federal officers should 
have complete charge of any regulations 
pertaining to Federal property." S.Rep. 
No. 2294, at 2. As no such departure from 
normal practice was intended by Congress, 
the Senate version of the bill was enacted. 
This background to the enactment of 
§ 290 shows that Congress did not intend 
to expose federal instrumentalities to the 
kind of detailed and mandatory regulation 
that is provided by the Ohio law at issue in 
this case. The Court's response on this 
point is simply to assert that "[t]he effects 
of direct regulation on the operation of 
federal projects are significantly |195more 
intrusive than the incidental regulatory ef-
fects of such an additional award provi-
sion." Ante, at 1712. In some instances 
the Court may be correct that the effects 
of direct regulation could be more intrusive 
than a provision for penalty awards, but 
the question here is not whether these two 
things are exactly the same, but simply 
whether the "regulatory effects" of the 
penalty provision, which as set out above 
are far from "incidental," are the kinds of 
effects that Congress did not intend to 
sanction when it enacted § 290. These ef-
fects are clearly impermissible under the 
rationale that the Senate articulated for 
removing from the bill the two obnoxious 
provisions that had been included in the 
House version. And even if I were to 
conclude that Congress had acted ambigu-
ously on this score, I would at least be 
forced to conclude that Congress offered 
no "clear" or "unambiguous" mandate for 
the kind of specific regulatory compulsion 
that this Ohio law exerts upon this federal 
facility. 
I therefore respectfully dissent. 
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Former employee brought action 
against former employer for breach of con-
tract, quantum meruit, misrepresentation, 
and outrageous conduct in connection with 
reduction in commissions. The United 
States District Court for the District of 
Colorado, Sherman G. Finesilver, Chief 
Judge, entered judgment on jury verdict 
for less than amount sought, denied em-
ployee's new trial motions, and later ren-
dered decision with regard to attorney fees. 
Employee appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
807 F.2d 155, dismissed, and employee peti-
tioned for writ of certiorari. The Supreme 
Court, Justice Scalia, held that district 
court's decision on merits was "final deci-
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sion," from which appeal had to be timely 
taken, even though employee's request for 
attorney fees had not yet been decided 
Affirmed 
1. Federal Courts <s=>372 
Although state law generally supplies 
rules of decision in federal diversity cases, 
it does not control resolution of issues gov-
erned by federal statute U S C A Const 
Art 6, cl 2 28 U S C A § 1652 
2. Federal Courts e=>433 
In diversity case, any question as to 
appealability of district court's decision as 
final decision on merits is question of fed-
eral and not state law U S C A Const 
Art 6, cl 2, 28 US CA §§ 1291, 1652 
3 Federal Courts <3=*433 
Federal procedural statute mandating 
when appeal might be taken from one fed-
eral court to another could properly be 
applied in diversity case without violating 
Tenth Amendment USC A Const 
Amend 10, 28 U S C A § 1291 
4. Federal Courts <s=>599 
Order ending litigation on ments may 
qualify as "final order" for purpose of ap-
peal, though question still remains to be 
decided, where resolution of question will 
not alter order or moot or revise decisions 
embodied in order 28 U S C A § 1291 
See publication Worlds and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions 
5. Federal Courts <S=>599 
Decision on mencs is "final decision" 
for purpose of appeal^ whether or not there 
remains for adjudication a request for at 
tomey fees attributable to case 28 
USC A § 1291 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions 
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Re 
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the 
6. Federal Courts <s=>670 
Court of Appeals was without jung<jy 
tion to review case on ments, where notiS 
of appeal was not timely fifoj* 
FRAPRules 2, 3(a), 4(a)(1), 26(b) 28 
USCA 
Syllabus * 
In petitioner's employment compensv 
tion action, which respondent remove* 
from a Colorado state court to the Federal 
District Court on the basis of diversity of 
citizenship, judgment was entered on thfc 
jury's verdict for petitioner in an amomfc 
considerably less than he had sought p$| 
titioner timely filed new trial motions and ^ 
motion for attorney's fees under Colorado 
law On May 14, 1984, the court denied th# 
new trial motions but found that petition 
was entitled to attorney's fees, and, 
August 1, 1984, entered a final order dete* 
mining the amount of the fees On Aug 
29, petitioner filed notice of appeal to 
Court of Appeals, covenng all of the Du 
tnct Court's post-trial orders Although 
affirming the attorney's fees award, tbi 
court granted respondent's motion to diaJ 
miss as to all other issues on the ground^ 
that the judgment was final and immediate*? 
ly appealable upon entry of the May \A 
order denying the new trial motions, an& 
that the appeal notice was not filed withu^ 
30 days of that order as required by Federal 
al Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(aXl) andi 
(4) 
Held 
1* The question whether the District 
Court's decision on the ments was appeal-
able before the attorney's fees determina-
tion was made is governed by federal law— 
specifically 28 U S C § 1291, which pro-
vides that all district court "final decisions" 
are appealable to the courts of appear -
and not by Colorado law Although state 
law generally supplies the rules of decision 
in federal diversity cases, it does not con-
trol the resolution of issues governed by 
federal statute The contention that the 
reader See United States v Detroit Lumber Co, 
200 US 321 337 26 S Ct 282 287 50 L Ed 
499 
486 U.S. 198 BUDINICH v. BECTON DICKINSON AND CO. 
Cite a* 108 S.Ct. 1717 (1988) 1719 
application of § 1291 to diversity cases 
would violate the Tenth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution is without merit, since 
§ 1291 is "rationally capable of classifica-
tion" as a procedural rule, and is therefore 
necessary and proper for implementing 
Congress' Art. Ill, § 1, power to establish 
federal courts. Kanna v. Plumer, 380 
U.S. 460, 472, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 1144, 14 
L.Ed.2d 8. Pp. 1719-1720. 
2. A decision on the merits is a "final 
decision" for purposes of § 1291, and is 
therefore immediately appealable, even 
though the recoverability or amount of at-
torney's fees for the litigation remains to 
be determined. The merits order ends the 
litigation on the merits, and the remaining 
fees question does not prevent finality, 
since it is collateral to, and separate^? 
from, the order, and resolution of it cannot 
alter or amend the order or moot any deci-
sions that the order embodies. According 
different treatment to attorney's fees when 
they are deemed part of the merits recov-
ery by statutory or decisional law (as peti-
tioner claims is the case in Colorado) would 
not serve § 1291's purposes, and would dis-
serve the interests of courts and litigants 
because, since the merits or nonmerits sta-
tus of a fee provision is often unclear, the 
issue of finality and hence the jurisdictional 
time for appeal would be left in doubt. 
The argument that the Court of Appeals' 
decision constitutes a significant change in 
the law and therefore should be applied 
only prospectively cannot avail petitioner, 
since, regardless of whether such a change 
has occurred, the untimely filed notice of 
appeal did not give the. court jurisdiction to 
review the merits decision. Pp. 1720-1722. 
807 F.2d 155 (CA10 1986), affirmed. 
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a 
unanimous Court 
Thomas Frank, Evergreen, Colo., for pe-
titioner. 
Terre Lee Rushton, Denver, Colo., for 
respondent. 
Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
Petitioner brought this action in Colorado 
state court to recover employment compen-
sation allegedly due. Respondent removed 
the case to the United States District Court 
for the District of Colorado on the basis of 
diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 
1441. A jury awarded petitioner a verdict 
of $5,000 (considerably less than had been 
sought), and judgment was entered on 
March 26, 1984. Petitioner timely filed 
new-trial motions, challenging various rul-
ings by the District Court, and a motion for 
attorney's fees. (Colorado law provides 
that in a suit to collect compensation due 
from employment "the judgment . . . shall 
include a reasonable attorney fee in favor 
of the winning party, to be taxed as part of 
the costs of the action." Colo.Rev.Stat 8-
4-114 (1986).) On May 14, 1984, the Dis-
trict Court denied the new-trial motions, 
found that petitioner was entitled to attor-
ney's fees, and requested further briefing 
and documentation before determining^ 
their amount. The District Court issued its 
final order concerning the attorney's fees 
on August 1, 1984. On August 29, petition-
er filed notice ef appeal to the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, covering all 
the District Court's post-trial orders. 
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the 
appeal, arguing that the judgment was fi-
nal and \ immediately appealable when the 
order denying the new-trial motions was 
entered May 14, 1984, and that the notice 
of appeal was not filed within 30 days of 
that order as required by Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) and (4). The 
Court of Appeals granted the motion to 
dismiss as to all issues except the award of 
attorney's fees, which it affirmed. We 
granted certiorari, 484 U.S. 895, 108 S.Ct. 
226, 98 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987), to resolve a 
conflict in the Courts of Appeals. Com-
pare, e.g., Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & 
Co., 682 F.2d 1143, 1146 (CA5 1982), cert, 
denied, 459 U.S. 1107, 103 S.Ct. 732, 74 
L.Ed.2d 956 (1983), with, e.g., Internation-
al Assn. of Bridge, Structural, Ornamen-
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tal, and Reinforcing Ironworkers' Local 
Union 75 v. Madison Industries, Inc., 733 
F.2d 656, 658 (CA9 1984). 
It is common ground in this case that if 
the District Court's decision on the merits 
was appealable before its determination of 
attorney's fees, then the merits appeal was 
untimely. See Fed. Rules App.Proc. 4(aXl), 
(4), (6); Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. 54(a), 58. Pe-
titioner contends that Colorado law gov-
erns this question and that "[u]nder Colora-
do law a claim is not final and appealable 
until attorneys fees are fully determined." 
Brief for Petitioner 13. We do not agree 
that Colorado law governs. 
[1-3] Although state law generally sup-
plies the rules of decision in federal diversi-
ty cases, see 28 U.S.C. § 1652; Erie R. Co. 
v, Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 
822, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), it does not con-
trol the resolution of issues governed by 
federal statute, see U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 
2 (Supremacy Clause); 28 U.S.C. § 1652; 
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-405, 87 S.Ct. 
1801, 1806, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967). Under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291, "all fina^decisions of 
the district courts" are appealable to the 
courts of appeals. In using the phrase 
"final decisions" Congress obviously did 
not mean to borrow or incorporate state 
law. "Final decisions" is not a term like 
"property," which naturally suggests a ref-
erence to state-law concepts, cf. Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 
2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); and the 
context of its use in § 1291 makes such a 
reference doubly implausible, since that 
provision applies to all federal litigation 
and not just diversity cases. Nor is it 
possible to accept petitioner's contention 
that § 1291 does not apply to diversity 
cases because that would violate the Tenth 
Amendment to the Constitution. We have 
held that enactments "rationally capable of 
classification" as procedural rules are nec-
essary and proper for carrying into execu-
tion the power to establish federal courts 
vested in Congress by Article III, § 1. 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472, 85 
S.Ct. 1136, 1144, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965); see 
also Burlington Northern R. Co. v. 
Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5, and n. 3, 107 S.Ct 
967, 969, and n. 3, 94 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). A 
statute mandating when an appeal may be 
taken from one federal court to another 
certainly meets this test. Cf. Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 
(1949) (treating appealability as an issue of 
federal law in a case brought under diversi-
ty jurisdiction). 
[4, 5] The question before us, therefore, 
is whether a decision on the merits is a 
"final decision" as a matter of federal law 
under § 1291 when the recoverability or 
amount of attorney's fees for the litigation 
remains to be determined. "A 'final deci-
sion' generally is one which ends the litiga-
tion on the merits and leaves nothing for. 
the court to do but execute the judgment" 
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 
65 S.Ct 631, 633-634, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945). 
A question remaining to be decided after 
an order ending litigation on the merits 
does not prevent finality if its resolution 
will not alter the order or moot or revise 
decisions embodied in the order. See, e.g., 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 
294, 308-309, 82 S.Ct 1502, 1514-1515, 8 
L.Ed.2d 510 (1962); Dickinson v. Petrole-
um Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 513-
516, 70 S.Ct. 322, 325-326, 94 L.Ed. 299 
(1950). We have all but held that an attor-
ney's fees determination 1 profits this de-
scription. In White v. New Hampshire 
Dept of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 
445, 102 S.Ct 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982), 
we held that a request for attorney's fees 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is not a motion "to 
alter or amend the judgment" within the 
meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
59(e) because it does not seek "reconsidera-
tion of matters properly encompassed in a 
decision on the merits." 455 U.S., at 451, 
102 S.Ct, at 1166. This holding was based 
on our conclusion that "a request for attor-
ney's fees under § 1988 raises legal issues 
collateral to" and "separate from" the deci-
sion on the merits. Id., at 451^452, 102 
486 U.S. 202 BUDINICH v. BECTON DICKINSON AND CO. 
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S.Ct, at 1166. We went so far as to ob-
serve in dicta that "[t]he collateral charac-
ter of the fee issue establishes that an 
outstanding fee question does not bar rec-
ognition of a merits judgment as 'final' and 
'appealable.'" Id., at 452-453, n. 14, 102 
S.Ct, at 1166-1167, n. 14. See also 
Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 
U.S. 161, 170, 59 S.Ct. 777, 781-782, 83 
L.Ed. 1184 (1939) (observing that a petition 
for attorney's fees in equity is "an indepen-
dent proceeding supplemental to the origi-
nal proceeding and not a request for a 
modification of the original decree"). 
The foregoing discussion is ultimately 
question-begging, however, since it as-
sumes that the order to which the fee issue 
was collateral was an order ending litiga-
tion on the merits. If one were to regard 
the demand for attorney's fees as itself 
part of the merits, the analysis would not 
apply. The merits would then not have 
been concluded, and § 1291 finality would 
not exist. See Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 740-742, 96 
S.Ct. 1202, 1204-1205, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 
(1976). As a general matter, at least, we 
think it indisputable that a claim for attor-
ney's fees is not part of the merits of the 
action to which the fees pertain. Such an 
award does not remedy the injury giving 
rise to the action, and indeed is often avail-
able to the party defending against the 
action. At common law, attorney's fees 
were regarded as an element of "costs" 
awarded to the prevailing party, see 10 C. 
Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2665 
(1983), which are not generally treated as 
part of the merits judgment, cf. Fed.Rule 
Civ.Proc. 58 ("Entry of the judgment 
j^pishall not be delayed for the taxing of 
costs"). Many federal statutes providing 
for attorney's fees continue to specify that 
they are to be taxed and collected as 
"costs," see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 
43-48, 105 S.Ct 3012, 3035-3036, 87 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (BRENNAN, J., dissent-
ing) (citing 63 such statutes)—as does, in 
fact, the Colorado statute at issue here. 
Petitioner contends, however, that the 
general status of attorney's fees for § 1291 
purposes must be altered when the statu-
tory or decisional law authorizing them 
makes plain (as he asserts Colorado law 
does) that they are to be part of the merits 
judgment. This proposition is not without 
some support. Some Courts of Appeals 
have held that the statutes creating liabili-
ty for attorney's fees can cause them to be 
part of the merits relief for purposes of 
§ 1291. See, e.g., Holmes v. J. Ray McDer-
mott & Co., 682 F.2d, at 1146; McQurter 
v. Atlanta, 724 F.2d 881, 882 (CA11 1984) 
(per curiam ). This Court itself implicitly 
acknowledged the possibility of such an 
approach in Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 
444 U.S. 472, 100 S.Ct 745, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 
(1980), where, in holding that a judgment 
on the merits was final and immediately 
appealable apart from the question of at-
torney's fees, we expressly distinguished 
cases in which the plaintiff had specifically 
requested attorney's fees as part of the 
prayer in his complaint. Id., at 479-480, 
100 S.Ct, at 749-750, n. 5. Now that we 
are squarely confronted with the question, 
however, we conclude that the § 1291 ef-
fect of an unresolved issue of attorney's 
fees for the litigation at hand should not 
turn upon the characterization of those 
fees by the statute or decisional law that 
authorizes them. 
We have said elsewhere that "[t]he con-
siderations that determine finality are not 
abstractions but have reference to very 
real interests—not merely those of the im 
mediate parties, but, more particularly 
those that pertain to the smooth function 
ing of our judicial system." Republic Nat 
ural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 69 
68 S.Ct. 972, 977, 92 L.Ed. 1212 (1948) 
Indeed, in the context of the finality provi-
sion governing appealability of matters 
from state courts to this Court, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1257,1202we have been willing in effect to 
split the "merits," regarding a claim for an 
accounting to be sufficiently "dissociated" 
from a related claim for delivery of physi-
cal property that "[i]n effect, such a contro-
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versy is a multiple litigation allowing re-
view of the adjudication which is concluded 
because it is independent of, and unaffect-
ed by, another litigation with which it hap-
pens to be entangled." Radio Station 
WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 126, 
65 S.Ct. 1475, 1479, 89 L.Ed. 2092 (1945). 
This practical approach to the matter sug-
gests that what is of importance here is not 
preservation of conceptual consistency in 
the status of a particular fee authorization 
as "merits" or "nonmerits," but rather 
preservation of operational consistency and 
predictability in the overall application of 
§ 1291. This requires, we think, a uniform 
rule that an unresolved issue of attorney's 
fees for the litigation in question does not 
prevent judgment on the merits from being 
final. 
For all practical purposes an appeal of 
merits-without-attorney's-fees when there 
is a statute deeming the attorney's fees to 
be part of the merits is no more harmful to 
the trial process than an appeal of merits-
without-attorney's-fees when there is no 
such statute. That "deeming"' does not 
render the appeal more disruptive of ongo-
ing proceedings, more likely to eliminate a 
trial judge's opportunity for reconsidera-
tion, more susceptible to being mooted by 
settlement, or in any way (except nominal-
ly) a more piecemeal enterprise. In short, 
no interest pertinent to § 1291 is served by 
according different treatment to attorney^, 
fees deemed part of the merits recovery; 
and a significant interest is disserved. The 
time of appealability, having jurisdictional 
consequences, should above all be clear. 
We are not inclined to adopt a disposition 
that requires/the merits or nonmerits sta-
tus of each attorney's fee provision to be 
clearly established before the time to ap-
peal can be clearly known. Courts and 
litigants are best served by the bright-line 
rule, which accords with traditional under-
standing, that a decision on the merits is a 
"final decision" for purposes of § 1291 
whether or not 1203there remains for adjudi* 
cation a request for attorney's fees attrib-
utable to the case. 
[6] Finally, petitioner argues that even 
if the Court of Appeals properly decided 
the question of appealability, the decision 
constitutes a significant change in the law 
and therefore should only be applied pro-
spectively. Regardless of whether today's 
decision works a change, our cases hold 
that "[a] court lacks discretion to consider 
the merits of a case over which it is with-
out jurisdiction, and thus, by definition, a 
jurisdictional ruling may never be made 
prospective only." Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379-380, 
101 S.Ct 669, 676, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981). 
Since the Court of Appeals properly held 
petitioner's notice of appeal from the deci-
sion on the merits to be untimely, and since 
the taking of an appeal within the pre-
scribed time is mandatory and jurisdiction-
al, see Fed. Rules App.Proc. 2, 3(a), 4(aXl), 
26(b); United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 
220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 288, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 
(1960); Farley Transportation Co. v. San-
ta Fe Trail Transportation Co., 778 F.2d 
1365, 1368-1370 (CA9 1985), the Court of 
Appeals was without jurisdiction to review 
the decision on the merits. 
• * • 
The Tenth Circuit correctly concluded 
that federal law governed the question of 
appealability and that petitioner's judgment 
on the merits was final and appealable 
when entered. Accordingly, its judgment 
is 
Affirmed. 
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APPENDIX 4 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Statutes 
Sec. 34-35-6/ Utah Code 
Sec. 34-35-7.1(3)(b), Utah Code 
Sec. 63-46b-12(l)(a)(iv), Utah Code 
Sec. 63-46b-14(2A), Utah Code 
Sec. 63-46b-16(4)(d), Utah Code 
Rules 
Rule 54/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 54(b)/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rulle 4(c)/ Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 35/ Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
34-35-6 LABOR IN GENERAL 290 
sions it has rendered, and the other work per-
formed by it, 
(1) recommend policies to the governor, and 
submit recommendation to employers, employ-
ment agencies and labor organizations to imple-
ment those policies, 
(j) recommend any legislation concerning dis-
crimination because of race sex, color, national 
origin, religion, age, or handicap to the governor 
that it considers necessary, 
(k) within the limits of any appropriations 
made for its operation, cooperate with other 
agencies or organizations, both public and pri-
vate, in the planning and conducting of educa-
tional programs designed to eliminate discrimi-
natory practices prohibited under this chapter, 
and 
(1) adopt an official seal 
(2) The division shall investigate alleged discrimi-
natory practices involving officers or employees of 
state government if requested to do so by the Career 
Service Review Board 
(3) (a) In any hearing held under the authority of 
this chapter, the division may 
(l) subpoena witnesses and compel their 
attendance at the hearing, 
(n) administer oaths and take the testi-
mony of any person under oath, and 
(m) compel any person to produce for ex-
amination any books, papers, or other infor-
mation relating to the matters raised by the 
complaint 
(b) Any of the following may conduct hearings 
d) the commission 
(n) any commissioner, 
(in) the coordinator, or 
dv) a hearing examiner or agent ap-
pointed by the commission 
(c) If a witness fails or refuses to obey a sub-
poena issued by the commission, the commission 
may petition the district court to enforce the sub-
poena 
(d) d) No person may be excused from attend-
ing or testifying or from producing records, 
correspondence, documents, or other evi-
dence in obedience to a subpoena issued by 
the commission under the authority of this 
section on the ground that the evidence or 
the testimony required may tend to incrimi-
nate him or subject him to any penalty or 
forfeiture 
(n) No person may be prosecuted or sub-
jected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on 
account of any transaction, matter, or thing 
concerning which he shall be compelled to 
testify or produce evidence after having 
claimed his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, except that a person testifying is not 
exempt from prosecution and punishment for 
perjury i860 
34-35-6. Discriminatory or unfair employment 
practices — Permitted practices. 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice 
(a) d) for an employer to refuse to hire, or pro-
mote, or to discharge, demote, terminate any 
person, or to retaliate against, harass, or dis-
criminate in matters of compensation or in 
terms, privileges, and conditions of employ-
ment against any person otherwise qualified, 
because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, child-
birth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, 
if the individual is 40 years of age or older, 
religion, national origin, or handicap No ap-
plicant nor candidate for any job or position 
may be considered "otherwise qualified," un-
less he possesses the education, training, 
ability, moral character, integrity, disposi-
tion to work, adherence to reasonable rules 
and regulations, and other job related quali-
fications required by an employer for any 
particular job, job classification, or position 
to be filled or created, 
(n) as used in this chapter, 'to discrimi-
nate in matters of compensation" means the 
payment of differing wages or salaries to em-
ployees having substantially equal experi-
ence, responsibilities, and skill for the par-
ticular job However, nothing in this chapter 
prevents increases in pay as a result of lon-
gevity with the empiojfer, if the salary in-
creases are uniformly applied and available 
to all employees on a substantially propor-
tional basis Nothing in this section pro-
hibits an employer and employee from agree-
ing to a rate of pav or work schedule de-
signed to protect the employee from loss of 
Social Security payment or benefits if the 
employee is eligible for those payments, 
(b) for an employment agency 
d) to refuse to list and properly classify for 
employment, or to refuse to refer an individ-
ual for employment, in a known available job 
for which the individual is otherwise quali-
fied, because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, 
religion, national origin, age, if the individ-
ual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap, 
(n) to comply with a request from an em-
ployer for referral of applicants for employ-
ment if the request indicates either directly 
or indirectly that the employer discriminates 
in employment on account of race, color, sex, 
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related 
conditions, religion, national origin, age, if 
the individual is 40 years of age or older, or 
handicap, 
(c) for a labor organization to exclude any indi-
vidual otherwise qualified from full membership 
rights in the labor organization, or to expel the 
individual from membership in the labor organi-
zation, or to otherwise discriminate against or 
harass any of its members in full employment of 
work opportunity, or representation, because of 
race, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-re-
lated conditions, religion, national origin, age, if 
the individual is 40 years of age or older, or 
handicap, 
(d) for any employer, employment agency, or 
labor organization to print, or circulate, or cause 
to be printed or circulated, any statement, adver-
tisement, or publication, or to use any form of 
application for employment or membership, or to 
make any inquiry in connection with prospective 
employment or membership, which expresses, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, any limitation, specifi-
cation, or discrimination as to race, color, reli-
gion, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-re-
lated conditions, national origin, age, if the indi-
vidual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap or 
intent to make any such limitation, specification, 
or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide 
occupational qualification, or required by, and 
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given to, an agency of government for security 
reasons; 
(e) for any person, whether or not an employer, 
an employment agency, a labor organization, or 
the employees or members thereof, to aid, incite, 
compel, or coerce the doing of an act defined in 
tnis section to be a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice, or to obstruct or prevent 
any person from complying with this chapter, or 
any order issued under it, or to attempt, either 
directly or indirectly, to commit any act prohib-
ited in this section, 
(0 for any employer, labor organization, joint 
apprenticeship committee, or vocational school, 
providing, coordinating, or controlling appren-
ticeship programs, or providing, coordinating, or 
controlling on-the-job-training programs, in-
struction, training, or retraining programs 
(l) to deny to, or withhold from, any quali-
fied person, because of race, color, sex, preg-
nancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related con-
ditions, religion, national origin, age, if the 
individual is 40 years of age or older, or 
handicap the right to be admitted to, or par-
ticipate in any apprenticeship training pro-
gram, on-the-job-training program, or other 
occupational instruction, training or retrain-
ing program, 
(n) to discriminate against or harass any 
qualified person in that person's pursuit of 
such programs, or to discriminate against 
such a person in the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of such programs, because of race, 
color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or preg-
nancy-related conditions, religion, national 
origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of 
age or older, or handicap, 
(in) to print, or publish, or cause to be 
printed or published, any notice or advertise-
ment relating to employment by the em-
ployer, or membership in or any classifica-
tion or referral for employment bv a labor 
organization, or relating to any classification 
or referral for employment by an employ-
ment agency, indicating any preference, lim-
itation, specification, or discrimination 
based on race, color sex, pregnancy, child-
birth, or pregnancy-related conditions, reli-
gion, national origin, age, if the individual is 
40 years of age or older, or handicap except 
that a notice or advertisement may indicate 
a preference, limitation, specification, or dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-re-
lated conditions, age, national origin, or 
handicap when religion, race, color, sex, age, 
national origin, or handicap is a bona fide 
occupational qualification for employment 
Nothing contained in Subsections (l)(a) through 
(l)(f) shall be construed to prevent the termination of 
employment of an individual who is physically, men-
tally, or emotionally unable to perform the duties re-
quired by that individual's employment, or to pre-
clude the variance of insurance premiums, of cover-
age on account of age, or affect any restriction upon 
the activities of individuals licensed by the liquor au-
thority with respect to persons under 21 years of age 
(2) (a) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited em-
ployment practice 
(0 for an employer to hire and employ em-
ployees, for an employment agency to clas-
sify or refer for employment any individual, 
for a labor organization to classify its mem-
bership or to classify or refer for employment 
any individual or for an employer, labor or-
ganization, or joint labor-management com-
mittee controlling apprenticeship or other 
training or retraining programs to admit or 
employ any individual in any such program, 
on the basis of religion, sex, pregnancy, 
childbirth or pregnancy-related conditions, 
age, national origin, or handicap in those 
certain instances where religion, sex, preg-
nancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related con-
ditions, age, if the individual is 40 years of 
age or older, national origin, or handicap is a 
bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of 
that particular business or enterprise, 
(n) for a school, college, university, or 
other educational institution to hire and em-
ploy employees of a particular religion if the 
school, college, university, or other educa-
tional institution is, in whole or in substan-
tial part, owned, supported, controlled, or 
managed by a particular religious corpora-
tion, association, or society, or if the curricu-
lum of the school, college, university, or 
other educational institution is directed to-
ward the propagation of a particular reli-
gion, 
(in) for an employer to give preference in 
employment to his own spouse, son, son-in-
law, daughter, daughter-in-law, or to any 
person for whom the employer is or would be 
liable to furnish financial support if those 
persons were unemployed, or for an em-
ployer to give preference in employment to 
any person to whom the employer during the 
preceding six months has furnished more 
than one-half of total financial support re-
gardless of whether or not the employer was 
or is legally obligated to furnish support, or 
for an employer to give preference in employ-
ment to any person whose education or train-
ing was substantially financed by the em-
ployer for a period of two years or more 
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter applies 
to any business or enterprise on or near an In-
dian reservation with respect to any publicly an-
nounced employment practice of the business or 
enterprise under which preferential treatment is 
given to any individual because he is a native 
American-Indian living on or near an Indian res-
ervation 
(c) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be 
interpreted to require any employer, employment 
agency, labor organization, vocational school, 
joint labor-management committee, or appren-
ticeship program subject to this chapter to grant 
preferential treatment to any individual or to 
any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, 
age, national origin, or handicap of the individ-
ual or group 3n account of an imbalance which 
may exist with respect to the total number or 
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, 
sex, age, national origin, or handicap employed 
by any employer, referred or classified for em-
ployment by an employment agency or labor or-
ganization, admitted to membership or classified 
by any labor organization, or admitted to or em-
ployed in, any apprenticeship or other training 
program, in comparison with the total number or 
percentage of persons of that race, color, religion, 
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sex, age, national origin, or handicap in any com-
munity or county or in the available work force 
in any community or county. 
(3) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited practice 
with respect to age to observe the terms of a bona fide 
seniority system or any bona fide employment benefit 
plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan 
which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of 
this chapter except that no such employee benefit 
plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3), or any other 
statutory provision to the contrary, other than Sub-
section (5) and Section 67-5-8, and except where age 
is a bona fide occupational qualification, no person 
shall be subject to involuntary termination or retire-
ment from employment on the basis of age alone, if 
the individual is 40 years of age or older. 
(5) Nothing in this section prohibits compulsory re-
tirement of an employee who has attained at least 65 
years of age, and who, for the two-year period imme-
diately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide 
executive or a high policymaking position, if that em-
ployee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable an-
nual retirement benefit from his employer's pension, 
profit-sharing, savings, or deferred compensation 
plan, or any combination of those plans, which bene-
fit equals, in the aggregate, at least $44,000. 1989 
34-35-7. Repealed. 1985 
34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to 
file claim — Investigations — Adjudi-
cative proceedings — Settlement — Re-
consideration — Determination. 
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment prac-
tice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent, 
make, sign, and file with the commission a re-
quest for agency action. 
(b) Every request for agency action shall be 
verified under oath or affirmation. 
(c) A request for agency action made under 
this section shall be filed within 180 days after 
the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employ-
ment practice occurred. 
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint appren-
ticeship committee, or vocational school who has em-
ployees or members who refuse or threaten to refuse 
to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file 
with the commission a request for agency action ask-
ing the commission for assistance to obtain their com-
pliance by conciliation or other remedial action. 
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any 
adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall 
promptly assign an investigator to attempt a set-
tlement between the parties by conference, con-
ciliation, or persuasion. 
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investiga-
tor shall make a prompt impartial investigation 
of all allegations made in the request for agency 
action. 
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and 
employees shall conduct every investigation in 
fairness to all parties and agencies involved, and 
may not attempt a settlement between the par-
ties if it is clear that no prohibited employment 
practice has occurred. 
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw 
the request for agency action, he must do so prior 
to the issuance of a final order. 
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are un-
successful, and the investigator uncovers insuffi-
cient evidence during his investigation to sup-
port the allegations of discrimination or prohib-
ited employment practice set out in the request 
for agency action, the investigator shall formally 
report these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, 
the director may issue a determination and an 
order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceed-
ing. 
(c) A party may make a written request to the 
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de 
novo the director's determination and orders 
within 30 days of the date of the determination 
and order for dismissal. 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are un-
successful, and the investigator uncovers suffi-
cient evidence during his investigation to sup-
port the allegations of discrimination or prohib-
ited employment practice set out in the request 
for agency action, the investigator shall formally 
report these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report 
the director may issue a determination and an 
order based on the investigator's report. 
(c) A party may file a written request to the 
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de 
novo the director's determination and order 
within 30 days of the date of the determination 
and order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request 
for a hearing, the order requiring the respondent 
to cease any discriminatory or prohibited em-
ployment practices and to provide relief to the 
aggrieved party becomes the final order of the 
commission. 
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator 
who investigated the matter may not participate in a 
hearing except as a witness, nor may he participate 
in the deliberations of the presiding officer. 
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hear-
ing, the party filing the request for agency action 
may reasonably and fairly amend any allegation, and 
the respondent may amend its answer. Those amend-
ments may be made during or after a hearing but 
only with permission of the presiding officer. 
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the 
presiding officer finds that a respondent has not 
engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited em-
ployment practice, the presiding officer shall is-
sue an order dismissing the director's determina-
tion and ending the adjudicative proceeding. 
(b) If a director's determination is dismissed, 
the presiding officer may order that the respon-
dent be reimbursed by the complaining party for 
his attorneys' fees and costs. 
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the pre-
siding officer finds that a respondent has engaged in 
a prohibited discriminatory practice, the presiding of-
ficer shall issue an order requiring the respondent to 
cease any discrimination or prohibited employment 
practice and to provide relief to the complaining 
party, including reinstatement, back pay and bene-
fits, and attorneys' fees. 
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be-urged 
and facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative pro-
cess. 
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for 
review of the order by the commission in accor-
dance with Section 63-46b-12. 
(b) If there is no timely request for review by 
the commission, the order issued by the presiding 
officer becomes the final order of the commission. 
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sex, age, national origin, or handicap in any com-
munity or county or in the available work force 
in any community or county. 
(3) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited practice 
with respect to age to observe the terms of a bona fide 
seniority system or any bona fide employment benefit 
plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan 
which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of 
this chapter except that no such employee benefit 
plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3), or any other 
statutory provision to the contrary, other than Sub-
section (5) and Section 67-5-8, and except where age 
is a bona fide occupational qualification, no person 
shall be subject to involuntary termination or retire-
ment from employment on the basis of age alone, if 
the individual is 40 years of age or older. 
(5) Nothing in this section prohibits compulsory re-
t i rement of an employee who has attained at least 65 
years of age, and who, for the two-year period imme-
diately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide 
executive or a high policymaking position, if tha t em-
ployee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable an-
nual retirement benefit from his employer's pension, 
profit-sharing, savings, or deferred compensation 
plan, or any combination of those plans, which bene-
fit equals, in the aggregate, at least $44,000. 1989 
34-35-7. Repealed. 1985 
34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to 
file claim — Investigations — Adjudi-
cative proceedings — Settlement — Re-
consideration — Determination. 
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment prac-
tice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent, 
make, sign, and file with the commission a re-
quest for agency action. 
(b) Every request for agency action shall be 
verified under oath or affirmation. 
(c) A request for agency action made under 
this section shall be filed within 180 days after 
the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employ-
ment practice occurred. 
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint appren-
ticeship committee, or vocational school who has em-
ployees or members who refuse or threaten to refuse 
to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file 
with the commission a request for agency action ask-
ing the commission for assistance to obtain their com-
pliance by conciliation or other remedial action. 
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any 
adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall 
promptly assign an investigator to attempt a set-
tlement between the parties by conference, con-
ciliation, or persuasion. 
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investiga-
tor shall make a prompt impartial investigation 
of all allegations made in the request for agency 
action. 
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and 
employees shall conduct every investigation in 
fairness to all parties and agencies involved, and 
may not attempt a settlement between the par-
ties if it is clear that no prohibited employment 
practice has occurred 
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw 
the request for agency action, he must do so prior 
to the issuance of a final order. 
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are un-
successful, and the investigator uncovers insuffi-
cient evidence during his investigation to sup-
port the allegations of discrimination or prohib-
ited employment practice set out in the request 
for agency action, the investigator shall formally 
report these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, 
the director may issue a determination and an 
order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceed-
ing. 
ic) A party may make a written request to the 
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de 
novo the directors determination and orders 
within 30 days of the date of the determination 
and order for dismissal. 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are un-
successful, and the investigator uncovers suffi-
cient evidence during his investigation to sup-
port the allegations of discrimination or prohib-
ited employment practice set out in the request 
for agency action, the investigator shall formally 
report these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report 
the director may issue a determination and an 
order based on the investigator's report. 
(c) A party may file a written request to the 
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de 
novo the director's determination and order 
within 30 days of the date of the determination 
and order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request 
for a hearing, the order requiring the respondent 
to cease any discriminatory or prohibited em-
ployment practices and to provide relief to the 
aggrieved party becomes the final order of the 
commission. 
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator 
who investigated the matter may not participate in a 
hearing except as a witness, nor may he participate 
in the deliberations of the presiding officer. 
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hear-
ing, the party filing the request for agency action 
may reasonably and fairly amend any allegation, and 
the respondent may amend its answer. Those amend-
ments may be made during or after a hearing but 
only with permission of the presiding officer. 
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the 
presiding officer finds that a respondent has not 
engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited em-
ployment practice, the presiding officer shall is-
sue an order dismissing the director's determina-
tion and ending the adjudicative proceeding. 
(b) If a director's determination is dismissed, 
the presiding officer may order that the respon-
dent be reimbursed by the complaining party for 
his attorneys' fees and costs. 
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the pre-
siding officer finds that a respondent has engaged in 
a prohibited discriminatory practice, the presiding of-
ficer shall issue an order requiring the respondent to 
cease any discrimination or prohibited employment 
practice and to provide relief to the complaining 
party, including reinstatement, back pay and bene-
fits, and attorneys' fees. 
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be u»ged 
and facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative pro-
cess. 
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for 
review of the order by the commission in accor-
dance with Section 63-46b-12. 
(b) If there is no timely request for review by 
the commission, the order issued by the presiding 
officer becomes the final order of the commission. 
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(c) The presiding officer may impose the condi-
tions at any time after the intervention. 1967 
63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hear-
ing, or after the filing of any post-hearing papers 
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the 
time required by any applicable statute or rule of 
the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and 
issue an order that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's 
findings of fact based exclusively on the evi-
dence of record in the adjudicative proceed-
ings or on facts officially noted; 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's 
conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the pre-
siding officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by 
the agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for recon-
sideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to administrative 
or judicial review of the order available to 
aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any recon-
sideration or review. 
(2) The presiding officer may use his experi-
ence, technical competence, and specialized 
knowledge to evaluate the evidence. 
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may 
be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that 
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
(4) This section does not preclude the presid-
ing officer from issuing interim orders to: 
(a) notify the parties of further hearings; 
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings 
on a portion of the issues presented; or 
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and effi-
cient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding. 
1988 
63-46b-ll. Default. 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of de-
fault against a party if: 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative pro-
ceeding fails to participate in the adjudicative 
proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to attend or participate in a properly sched-
uled hearing after receiving proper notice; or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative pro-
ceeding fails to file a response under Section 
63-46b-6. 
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of 
the grounds for default and shall be mailed to all 
parties. 
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the 
agency set aside the default order, and any order 
in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent 
to the default order, by following the procedures 
outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any 
subsequent order shall be made to the presiding 
officer. 
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review 
under Section 63-46b-12, or reconsideration un-
der Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision of the 
presiding officer on the motion to set aside the 
default. 
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the 
agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun 
by a party that has other parties besides the 
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after 
issuing the order of default, conduct any further 
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudica-
tive proceeding without the participation of the 
party in default and shall determine all issues in 
the adjudicative proceeding, including those af-
fecting the defaulting party. 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no 
parties other than the agency and the party in 
default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing 
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding. 1988 
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit par-
ties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review 
of an order by the agency or by a superior agency, 
the aggrieved party may file a written request 
for review within 30 days after the issuance of 
the order with the person or entity designated for 
that purpose by the statute or rule. 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the 
relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was 
mailed; and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer 
and to each party. 
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the re-
quest for review, or within the time period provided 
by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may 
file a response with the person designated by statute 
or rule to receive the response. One copy of the re-
sponse shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and 
to the presiding officer. 
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review 
of an order by the agency or a superior agency, the 
agency or superior agency shall review the order 
within a reasonable time or within the time required 
by statute or the agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior 
agency may by order or rule permit the parties to file 
briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument. 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to 
all parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of 
any response, other filings, or oral argument, or 
within the time required by statute or applicable 
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a 
written order on review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the 
agency head or by a person designated by the 
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to 
each party. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule per-
mitting or requiring review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues 
reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the 
issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding 
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed, 
or modified, and whether all or any portion 
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of the adjudicative proceeding is to be re-
manded, 
(vn) a notice of any right of further ad-
ministrative reconsideration or judicial re-
view available to aggrieved parties, and 
mil) the time limits applicable to any ap-
peal or review 1968 
63-46b-13. A g e n c y rev i ew — Recons iderat ion . 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order 
is issued for which review by the agency or by a 
superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is un-
available, and if the order would otherwise con-
stitute final agency action, any party may file a 
written request for reconsideration with the 
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which 
relief is requested 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the 
filing of the request is not a prerequisite for seek-
ing judicial review of the order 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed 
with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to 
each party by the person making the request 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for 
that purpose, shall issue a written order granting 
the request or denying the request 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated 
for tha t purpose does not issue an order within 20 
days after the filing of the request, the request 
for reconsideration shall be considered to be de-
nied 1968 
63~46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action, except in actions where judicial 
review is expressly prohibited by statute 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after ex-
hausting all administrative remedies available, ex-
cept that 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not 
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter 
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required, 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judi-
cial review of the requirement to exhaust any or 
all administrative remedies if 
U) the administrative remedies are inade-
quate, or 
(n) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring ex-
haustion 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial re-
view of final agency action within 30 days after 
the date that the order constituting the final 
agency action is issued or is considered to have 
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b) 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all 
other appropriate parties as respondents and 
shall meet the form requirements specified in 
this chapter 1968 
63-46b-15. Jud ic ia l r ev i ew — Informal adjudi-
cative proceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to 
review by trial de novo all final agency actions 
resulting from informal adjudicative proceed-
ings, except that the juvenile court shall have 
jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating 
to removal or placement decisions regarding chil-
dren in state custody 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the 
statute governing the agency or, in the absence 
of such a venue provision, in the county where 
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal 
place of business 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and shall include 
(D the name and mailing address of the 
party seeking judicial review, 
(n) the name and mailing address of the 
respondent agency, 
(m) the title and date of the final agency 
action to be reviewed, together with a dupli-
cate copy, summary, or brief description of 
the agency action, 
dv) identification of the persons who were 
parties in the informal adjudicative proceed-
ings that led to the agency action, 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from 
the informal proceeding, 
(vi) facta demonstrating that the party 
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review, 
(vn) a request for relief, specifying the 
type and extent of relief requested, 
(vm) a statement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in 
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall de-
te rmine all questions of fact and law and any 
consti tut ional issue presented in the pleadings 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judi-
cial proceedings under th is section 1990 
63-46b-16. Jud ic ia l r e v i e w — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings 
i2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the fonm required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record, 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record, or 
(n) according to any other provision of 
law 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any ot the following 
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(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
1988 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudica-
tive proceedings by the district court or the re-
view of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or 
compensation only to the extent expressly autho-
rized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discre-
tion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of 
agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for 
further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of 
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, 
if authorized by statute. 1087 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other 
temporary remedies pending final dis-
position. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the 
agency may grant a stay of its order or other tempo-
rary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or 
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary cir-
cumstances require immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other tem-
porary remedies requested by a party, the agency's 
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall 
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary 
remedy was not granted. 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other tempo-
rary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or 
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may 
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it 
finds that: 
(a) the agency violated its own rules in deny-
ing the stay; or 
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is 
likely to prevail on the merits when the 
court finally disposes of the matter; 
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will 
suffer irreparable injury without immediate 
relief; 
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking 
review will not substantially harm other 
parties to the proceedings; and 
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, 
or welfare relied upon by the agency is not 
sufficiently serious to justify the agency's ac-
tion under the circumstances. 1967 
63-46b-19. Civil enforcement 
(1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by 
law, an agency may seek enforcement of an order 
by seeking civil enforcement in the district 
courts. 
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an 
agency's order must name, as defendants, each 
alleged violator against whom the agency seeks 
to obtain civil enforcement. 
(c) Venue for an action seeking civil enforce-
ment of an agency's order shall be determined by 
the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
(d) The action may request, and the court may 
grant, any of the following: 
(i) declaratory relief; 
(ii) temporary or permanent injunctive re-
lief; 
(iii) any other civil remedy provided by 
law; or 
(iv) any combination of the foregoing. 
(2) (a) Any person whose interests are directly im-
paired or threatened by the failure of an agency 
to enforce an agency's order may timely file a 
complaint seeking civil enforcement of that or-
der, but the action may not be commenced: 
(i) until at least 30 days after the plaintiff 
has given notice of his intent to seek civil 
enforcement of the alleged violation to the 
agency head, the attorney general, and to 
each alleged violator against whom the peti-
tioner seeks civil enforcement; 
(ii) if the agency has filed and is diligently 
prosecuting a complaint seeking civil en-
forcement of the same order against the 
same or a similarly situated defendant; or 
(iii) if a petition for judicial review of the 
same order has been filed and is pending in 
court. 
(b) The complaint seeking civil enforcement of 
an agency's order must name, as defendants, the 
agency whose order is sought to be enforced, the 
agency that is vested with the power to enforce 
the order, and each alleged violator against 
whom the plaintiff seeks civil enforcement. 
(c) Except to the extent expressly authorized 
by statute, a complaint seeking civil enforcement 
of an agency's order may not request, and the 
court may not grant, any monetary payment 
apart from taxable costs. 
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an 
agency's order, in addition to any other defenses al-
lowed by law, a defendant may defend on the ground 
that: 
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PART VII. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
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from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3) 
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the 
appellate court and costs in original proceed-
ings before the Supreme Court, were repealed 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. See, 
now, Rule 34(d), Utah R.App.P. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 54, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Continuances, discre-
§ 
tion to require payment of costs, U.R.C.P. 
40(b). 
Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costs, 
49-6-301. 
State, payment of costs awarded against, 
§ 78-27-13. 
Stay of judgment up>on multiple claims, 
U.R.C.P. 62(h). 
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Absence of express determination. 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Appeal as of right. 
Certification not determinative. 
Costs. 
—In general. 
—Challenge of award. 
—Depositions. 
—Discretionary. 
—Expenses of preparation for action. 
—Failure to object. 
—Liability of state. 
—Service on adverse party. 
—Statutory limits. 
—Untimely filing of memorandum. 
—When not demanded. 
Default judgments. 
Effect of partial final judgment. 
Final order. 
—Appealability. 
—Attorney's fee award. 
—Claims for relief. 
—Complete disposal of claim or party. 
—Multiple parties. 
—No just reason for delay. 
—Review of finality. 
—Separate claims. 
Inconsistent oral statements. 
Interest on judgment. 
Judgment based on unpleaded theory. 
Judgment in favor of nonparty. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Pleading in the alternative. 
Presumption of finality. 
Real party in interest. 
Relief not demanded in pleadings. 
Specific performance request. 
Unpleaded issue tried by consent. 
Cited. 
Absence of express determination. 
In action based on alleged breach of loan 
agreement, where trial court improperly dis-
missed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with 
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judg-
ment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judg-
ment on cross-claim and counterclaim would 
be subject, on remand, to revision since all 
claims presented had not been adjudicated and 
since trial court made no express determina-
tion as required by this section. M. & S. Constr. 
& Eng'g Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah 
2d 139, 467 P.2d 410 (1970). 
Amendment of pleadings. 
The proper application of Rule 15(b) and 
Subdivision (c)(1) of this rule, is that amend-
ments should be allowed where a case has ac-
tually been tried on a different issue or a differ-
ent theory than had been pleaded. First Sec. 
Bank v. Colonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d 859 
(Utah 1979). 
Appeal as of right. 
Wliere the requirements of this rule concern-
ing appeal of orders in multi-party or multi-
claim actions are satisfied, the parties are enti-
tled to appeal such orders as a matter of right, 
and the Supreme Court does not have discre-
tion to refuse to review the orders. Pate v. Mar-
athon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984). 
After a party or parties have availed them-
selves of the provisions of Subdivision (b), al-
lowing an entry of judgment on "fewer than all 
of the claims or parties," an appeal may be had 
on the adjudicated claims or by those parties. 
All Weather Insulation, Inc., v. Amiron Dev. 
Corp., 702 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1985). 
Certification not determinative. 
This rule does not necessarily mean there is 
a final judgment merely because the court's or-
der so recites; there was in fact no final judg-
ment where the trial court denied defendant's 
motion to dismiss, thus leaving the parties in 
court, then entered an order that the denial 
was a final judgment. Little v. Mitchell, 604 
P.2d 918 (Utah 1979). 
Costs. 
—In general. 
Costs were not recoverable at common law 
and are therefore generally allowable only in 
the amounts and in the manner provided by 
statute. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 
(Utah 1980). 
"Costs," as used in Subdivision (d)(1), means 
those fees which are required to be paid to the 
court and to witnesses, and which the statutes 
authorize to be included in the judgment. 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). 
Subdivision (d)(2) provides a process of re-
view by a trial court of the amount claimed to 
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an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judg- An unsigned minute entry does not consti-
ment for purposes of appeal. Wilson v. Man- tute a final order for purposes of appeal. State 
ning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982): Utah State v. Crowley, 737 P 2d 198 (Utah 1987). 
Tax ComnVn v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah ~.x , TT r . rt,rt „ ^, ^rt, 
1986); Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah ^ ' J* ! ' " " " s t o n V" ^eW1S ' * 1 8 Z2* 33nlQ 
1986); Ahistrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979 ^ ! , " \ ) ; B°g n g* V" B ° g g S ' 8 2 4 P 2 d 4 7 8 
(Utah 1986). ( U t a h Ct- APP' 1 9 9 1 K 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Appealability of order suspending 
imposition or execution of sentence, 51 
A.L.R.4th 939. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. 
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
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(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency appeals. In all other matters 
before the court, including appeals from an agency, costs may be allowed as in 
cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days after the expiration of the 
time in which a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after an 
order denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have been awarded 
may file with the clerk of the appellate court and serve upon the adverse party 
an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days 
after the service of the bill of costs file a notice of objection and a motion to 
have the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed within 
the allotted time, the clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment 
against the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to the cost bill, 
the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the 
costs, tax the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against the 
adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by the 
court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of 
judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument shall not be permitted. A 
judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in 
the state, who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manner and 
with the same force and effect as judgments of the district court. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and C.J.S. — 5 C J.S. Appeal and Error § 1979. 
Error $§ 1009 to 1024. Key Numbers. — Costs «=» 221 et seq. 
Rule 35. Petition for rehearing. 
(a) Time for filing; contents; answer; oral argument not permitted. A 
rehearing will not be granted in the absence of a petition for rehearing. A 
petition for rehearing may be filed with the clerk within 14 days after the 
entry of the decision of the court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by 
order. The petition shall state with particularity the points of law or fact 
which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended and 
shall contain such argument in support of the petition as the petitioner de-
sires. Counsel for petitioner must certify that the petition is presented in good 
faith and not for delay. Oral argument in support of the petition will not be 
permitted. No answer to a petition for rehearing will be received unless re-
quested by the court. The answer to the petition for rehearing shall be filed 
within 14 days after the entry of the order requesting the answer, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court. A petition for rehearing will not be granted in 
the absence of a request for an answer. 
(b) Form of petition; length. The petition shall be in a form prescribed by 
Rule 27. An original and six copies shall be filed with the court. Two copies 
shall be served on counsel for each party separately represented. Except by 
order of the court, a petition for rehearing and any response requested by the 
court shall not exceed 15 pages. 
(c) Action by court if granted. If a petition for rehearing is granted, the 
court may make a final disposition of the cause without reargument, or may 
restore it to the calendar for reargument or resubmission, or may make such 
other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the partic-
ular case. 
(d) Untimely or consecutive petitions. Petitions for rehearing that are 
not timely presented under this rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing 
will not be received by the clerk. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
